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ABSTRACT 
SEC REGULATION OF CORPORATE 10K FILING DATES: 
THE EFFECT ON EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND MARKET RECOGNITION 
Robert W. Russ, CPA 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2005 
Director: Dr. Ruth W. Epps 
Professor and Chairman 
Department of Accounting 
In November 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission released a final 
ruling regarding a filing requirement change. The proposed requirement change was for 
domestic companies to file annual and quarterly reports within 60 and 30 days, 
respectfully. This requirement was recommended for companies with a market value of 
at least $75 million and would reduce by 30 days the time allowed to file these reports. 
The Wall Street Journal article announcing this proposal stated the change was an effort 
to address some of the problems arising from accounting scandals such as the Enron 
scandal of 2001. A potential added benefit of the SEC rule change might be a reduction 
in earnings management. 
The purpose of this study is two fold. The first part is to test the theory that 
earnings management takes time. The second purpose is to examine the question of 
market recognition of earnings management. Sloan (1996) and other researchers report 
that the market does not recognize earnings management in the long term. Xie's (2001) 
results suggest that the market over prices earnings management. Balsam et al. (2002) 
found the market reacted negatively to abnormal accruals. The current research study 
uses a larger sample including firms not suspected of earnings management and fails to 
confirm the Balsam et al. result. The findings of the current study suggest that the results 
of the Balsam et al. study are either the result of the data selection process used in that 
study or the data selection process used by Balsam et al. controlled for other market 
fluctuations not included in the current study. 
The results of this study suggest a positive relationship between earnings 
management and the time to file annual reports. This finding supports for the theory that 
moving earnings fiom a future period to the current period requires time. Thus, the SEC 
rule change to reduce the time to file annual reports sliould reduce a company's ability to 
manipulate earnings. 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In November 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission released a final 
ruling regarding a filing requirement change. The requirement change is for domestic 
companies to file annual and quarterly reports within 60 and 30 days of the end of the 
period, respectively. This requirement is recommended for companies with a market 
value of at least $75 million. The proposed change reduces by 30 days the time allowed 
to file these reports and will be phased in between 2003 and 2006. 
The official SEC release states that annual reports contain significant information 
used by stakeholders in their investing and voting decisions, and more timely 
presentation of this information to the public would be beneficial (SEC 2002). The 
official SEC release is supported by prior research which found significant market 
reaction to 10K filings (Asthma and Balsam 2001; Griffin 2003). The prior research has 
found that the market reacts to annual report filings (Asthana et al. 2001) and in the case 
of late annual filings, the market reacts negatively (Griffin 2003). The conclusion of both 
of these studies is that information contained in the annual report filings is value relevant. 
Griffin (2003) further concludes that the timeliness of the annual reports is value relevant. 
Prior research on the timeliness of annual report filings reveals several issues. 
Alford et al. (1 994) found firms that are late filing 10K's are generally small andlor 
financially troubled. Typically, these firms are also experiencing negative market 
adjusted stock returns. To reduce these negative stock returns, management could be 
motivated to manipulate the financial results of the company. Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997; 1998) found that management has incentives to manage earnings to avoid earnings 
fluctuations. 
Givoly and Palmon (1982) study the timeliness of annual report filings, concluded 
that over the period of 1960 to 1974, companies have shortened the number of days from 
an average of 63 days to an average 4 1 days to file reports. Defining bad news as 
earnings less than expected, they also found bad news reporting was delayed and the 
market reaction to the bad news was reduced by the duration of the delay. They 
speculate that information from other sources preempts the stock market reaction to the 
late earnings announcement. Givoly and Palmon (1982) also found that the timelines of 
the annual filings was more related to intra-industry patterns and company traditions than 
company attributes. This lead Givoly and Palmon to conclude that management has 
discretion over the time of the filing. 
Earnings management research has presented evidence that when management is 
motivated and has the means to manipulate earnings, management manipulates earnings 
to reach company goals. Trueman (1 990) theorized that earnings management takes time 
and proposed two possible explanations. One possibility is that management attempts to 
move earnings between periods and this effort takes time. The second possibility is that 
management waits for the results of other firms in the industry to announce earnings and 
then adjusts their earnings to match industry results. For example, Chai and Tung (2002) 
found that companies engaging in earnings management release earnings announcements 
later than companies that do not engage in earnings management. The SEC rule change 
could have the benefit of reducing company ability to manipulate earnings. 
Earnings management research investigates relationships/events that may give 
rise to management's manipulation of earnings. In a survey of the earnings management 
literature, Healy and Wahlen (1 999) conclude that researchers have been successful in 
finding occasions where earnings management is present, but no research has examined 
how regulators might control or limit earnings management. The current study starts the 
process of identifying methods for regulators to limit earnings management. 
Lynn Turner, past chief accountant at the SEC (Turner and Godwin 1999), called 
for more academic research to assist the SEC in identifying methods to reduce earnings 
management. The current research examines the impact of how regulators might limit 
earnings management by limiting the amount of time that is allowed to prepare and 
present annual financial information to investors. 
To extend the earnings management literature to identifying a potential control for 
earnings management, the purpose of this research project is to test the theory that 
earnings management takes time. Trueman (1990) stated that either time is required to 
move earnings from one period to another or that companies wait to see results from 
competitors before making their own earnings management decisions as two possible 
reasons for delays in reporting caused by earnings management. Regardless of which 
factor (time to move earnings, or waiting to know the industry results) actually causes the 
delay, the SEC change in time to file reports will reduce the time available to file reports 
and might also limit their ability to manipulate earnings. 
Specifically, this study uses a large sample of annual report filings and 
simultaneous equations to investigate if earnings management requires additional time in 
relationship to annual report filings. A sample of annual report filings from 1992 to 2003 
is used. The companies included in the current study are non-financial, non-utility, 
domestic f m s  that have five or more years of annual filings in the EDGAR database 
with corresponding financial data available from Compustat. This study tests for a 
relationship between abnormal accruals (earnings management) and the timeliness of 
annual report filing. Findings of the current study that support the relationship between 
earnings management and reporting timeliness provide evidence that the SEC rule change 
can have the additional benefit of reducing earnings management. 
Earnings management for the current study is measured by calculating abnormal 
accruals using the cash flow variant of the modified Jones model (Hribar et al. 2002). 
Timeliness is measured by the number of days between the company fiscal yearend and 
the date the annual 1 OK report is filed with the SEC. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. The next chapter 
reviews previous research on the timeliness of corporate reporting and earnings 
management. The model, hypotheses, and methodology are developed in chapter 111. 
Chapter IV presents the results and Chapter V provides a summary, conclusion, 
limitations, and recommendations for future research. 
CHAPTER I1 
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The purpose of this study is to test the relationship between earnings management 
and the timeliness of annual report filings. A significant relationship between earnings 
management and the timeliness of filings provides support for the theory that earnings 
management requires time (Trueman 1990). Finding support for this theory may indicate 
that the SEC rule change, reducing the time to file annual reports, may also reduce a 
company's ability to manipulate earnings. 
Testing the relationship between earnings management and the timeliness of 
annual report filings generates two objectives for this study. One is a research question 
of testing the theory that earnings management takes time by testing the timeliness of 
annual report filings. The second objective is to answer the following research question: 
Does the market recognize earnings management? 
Two major areas of literature are relevant to this study: Timeliness of corporate 
reporting in relationship to earnings management, and earnings management as it relates 
to market reaction. The research on reporting timeliness has produced literature 
regarding issues that affect the timeliness of earnings announcements and corporate 
report filings. The literature on earnings management has produced a wealth of literature 
indicating that there is incentive to manipulate earnings and where the incentive exists, 
earnings management exists. Research on market recognition of earnings management 
has produced a small quantity of published studies in which all but one of these studies 
indicate that the market does not recognize earnings management. 
In the section on timeliness, a review of the literature relating to when companies 
announce earnings andlor file statutory reports. The research on timeliness indicates that 
companies file reports/announce earnings at traditional time intervals. The literature also 
provides characteristics associated with reportinglannouncement delays. Trueman's 
theory states that earnings management requires time, therefore companies that are 
engaging in earnings management should have delayed reportingJfilings. Trueman's 
theory is supported by the work of Chai and Tung (2002) who found earnings 
management present in late announcing firms. The characteristics associated with late 
reporting/announcements are used as control variables in the current study. The 
timeliness of reporting section concludes with a summary of the selected literature 
regarding the market reaction to reporting/announcement timeliness. 
The earnings management section presents a review of the literature which 
examines management incentive and opportunity to manage earnings. This review 
provides evidence that management engages in earnings management when motivation is 
sufficient. This section also provides control variables needed for the earnings 
management model used in the study. The earnings management section concludes with 
a review of the literature which examines market reaction to earnings management. The 
literature examining the market reaction to earnings management has mixed results. 
Some literature finds the market does not recognize earnings management. And one 
study that finds, at least in the short term, which the market does react to earnings 
management present in financial reports. The earnings management section also includes 
a section on the evolution of the measurement of abnormal accruals, used in the literature 
to measure earnings management. 
Timeliness of Corporate Reporting 
In an early study of timeliness of filings, Dyer and McHugh (1975) tested the 
attributes of 120 Australian companies from 1965 to 1971. The primary purpose of the 
research was to establish the impact of corporate attributes on corporate filing timeliness. 
Dyer and McHugh (1975) found that larger companies (above $50M in total assets) 
reported sooner than smaller companies (less than $5M in total assets), The 
characteristics found to be significant were corporate size and company year-end. 
Whittred (1 980b) replicated the Dyer and McHugh study using a random sample 
of 100 Australian firms from 1972 to 1977. The purpose of the replication was to test the 
effect of a new listing requirement by the Australian Associated Stock Exchanges. The 
listing requirement change was a reduction in the time allowed for companies to file their 
annual reports. The results of the Whittred study indicate that the change in requirement 
had no effect on the timeliness of corporate reporting. The companies that were able to 
file before the four month requirement were already filing before that date and the firms 
that failed to file timely before the reduced reporting requirement also failed to file timely 
after the reduced time period requirement was implemented. 
Using the same 100 Australian companies from the Whittred study, Davies and 
Whittred (1980) study research further examine company attributes that might help 
explain the reporting delay reported in the Dyer and McHugh (1975) study. Davies and 
Whittred ranked all companies in the sample and used quartiles to determine large and 
small companies. The results revealed that both the small and large firms (first and 
fourth quartiles) reported sooner than the moderate size firms (second and third 
quartiles). Further, Davies and Whittred tested auditor attributes for their effect on delay. 
While the testing found no association between then Big 8 audit firms and other audit 
firms, there was an association between a change in auditors and reporting delay. In 
contrast to Dyer and McHugh, Davies and Whittred did not find firm yearend or 
profitability to be significant. They did find that companies experiencing extremes in 
profitability experienced reporting delays. 
Zeghal(1984) tested the usefulness of accounting information in relation to the 
timeliness of that information. Using the announcement of financial statement 
publication for 1400 firms between 1973 and 1975, Zeghal tested the market reaction to 
the financial statement announcements. The results of this study showed that information 
presented earlier to financial statement users earlier has more relevance (greater market 
reaction). Zeghal found the relevance of the information was greater for interim 
statements than for annual reports. He suggested that the information in the annual report 
was anticipated more than the information contained in the interim statements and the 
market had already reacted to the information contained in the annual report, making the 
annual report a confirmatory process. The lower reaction to annual reports could be 
related to the time required to distribute the annual reports. 
Alford et al. (1994) examined firms that file SEC form 10K after the statutory 
filing period of 90 days. Using a sample of 38,775 10K filings from 7,887 firms between 
1978 and 1985, the authors found that 20 percent of firms missed the statutory filing date. 
Further examination revealed common characteristics for late filers. In particular, late 
filers are not random but are generally small, have negative earnings changes, low 
liquidity, high leverage, and experience negative market reactions. The majority of these 
firms also have experienced an unfavorable economic event. Fifty percent of the late 
filers in their sample indicated the reason for late filing was due to debt renegotiation or 
financial distress. 
Givoly and Palmon (1982) examined earnings announcements and found a 
significant but weak relationships with bad news delays. The authors used a sample of 
2,836 earnings announcements collected from The Wall Street Journal Index for the years 
1960 to 1974. Their results reveal a steady decline in reporting delay over the time 
period. The purpose of their study was to find common firm characteristics related to the 
observed timeliness of earnings announcements. Givoly and Palmon found that company 
size and complexity of the audit were associated with the timeliness of earnings 
announcements. Company size was inversely related to the timeliness of filing1; larger 
companies report earlier than small companies. The authors used a ratio of inventory to 
total assets as a proxy for complexity. 
Keller (1986) hypothesized that qualified audit opinions would cause a delay in 
earnings announcements and report filings. Using a sample of firms from 1973 to 1977 
Keller found a delay in announcement and filings by firms that were given subject to 
audit opinions by their auditors. Keller also found that the correct event date for studying 
audit delay was not the earnings announcement date but the annual report date. 
Similarly, Whittred (1 980a) collected a random sample of 100 companies financial 
statements between 1965 and 1974 and discovered that qualified audit opinions would 
lead to a delay in the annual report filing. Indeed, for Australian companies, qualified 
audit opinions had a significant effect on the timeliness of annual reports. 
Because audit delay can affect reporting delay, Dyer and McHugh (1975) 
examined audit signatures as a source of delay in financial reporting. Their results 
suggest that the timing of audit signatures was stationary over time, having an effect on 
the time of the filing, but not an effect on early or late filing. Ashton et al. (1989) 
examined audit delay in more detail because audit delay can affect reporting delay. The 
authors used a sample of 842 Canadian firms that traded on the Toronto exchange. 
Ashton et al. found that companies reporting net losses and extraordinary items had 
greater audit delays. Companies with December and January yearends had fewer audit 
delays. While the results were significant, they explained very little of the variation in 
reporting timeliness. Intra-industry patterns explained more variability in reporting delay 
than individual company characteristics. 
' Timeliness of filing was defined in Givoly and Palmon (1982) as the number of days between the 
company year end and the filing date. 
Extending the audit delay research, Barnber et al. (1993) studied audit factors that 
influence audit reporting delay. The authors hypothesized that the extent of audit work, 
audit firm technology, and auditor incentives to expend more time were determinants of 
audit reporting lag. Using a sample of 972 firm years between 1983 and 1985, the 
authors found that auditor business risk (proxied by concentration of ownership and 
financial condition), audit complexity (proxied by industry), company size, and other 
factors (extraordinary items, net losses, and qualified opinions) were all significant 
factors in explaining audit delay. 
Other research has examined the release date of earnings information. The extant 
research in this area suggests that companies with bad news tend to release information 
later, and that companies with good news tend to release information earlier (Chambers 
and Penman 1984). Chambers and Penman (1984) used a random sample of 100 firms 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange; collected annual dates from The Wall Street 
Journal Index, and obtained a sample of 2,756 firm-years from 1970 to 1976. These 
authors found an inverse relationship between size and announcement timing (large firms 
announce earlier). Chambers and Penman also found early reports generally reflect good 
news while later reports reflect bad news. 
In extending this concept to 10K, filings Easton and Zmijewski (1993) used a 
sample of 76,866 1 OK filings and 193,283 10-Q filings from 1962 to 1985. The authors 
found that the good news, (bad news) issue did not affect annual filings. The good news, 
bad news was found to be an issue with earnings announcements but not in annual filings. 
Courtis (1976) used a sample of 204 New Zealand firms and found results 
comparable to Chambers and Penman (1984). Courtis found some industry variation in 
the timeliness of filings. Also, early and late reporting firms had statistically significant 
differences in profitability. 
Chai and Tung (2002) examined earnings announcement timing and earnings 
management. Using a sample of 10,503 firm year observations, Chai and Tung report 
that discretionary accruals were influenced by late announcements. They defined late 
announcements as earnings announcements that were made more than five days later than 
the prior year. Further, the magnitude of discretionary accruals was also associated with 
the magnitude of the delay in making the earnings announcement. 
Bankruptcy issues have also been associated with reporting delays. Whittred and 
Zimmer (1984) reported that Australian companies approaching bankruptcy had 
significant reporting delays for three years prior to a company filing bankruptcy. Their 
sample consisted of 53 failed firms between 1964 and 1978. Lawrence (1 983) used a 
sample of 1 10 firms that filed bankruptcy between 1975 and 198 1 and also found 
significant reporting delays for those companies filing bankruptcy. 
Market Reaction to Earnings Management Literature 
A large volume of literature has examined market reaction to various 
characteristics of earnings announcements/report filings. The following section reviews 
the literature regarding the market reaction to the timeliness of announcement/filing 
dates. Research has addressed other issues that theoretically affect market reaction to 
earnings announcements. Included in this research is the issue of the timing of earnings 
announcements. Kross and Schroeder (1984), using sample consisted of 3,552 quarterly 
observations from 1977 to 1980. Kross and Schroeder hypothesize a relationship 
between type of news (good news vs. bad news) and the timing of the earnings 
announcement. They fbrther hypothesize a relationship between the market reaction and 
the timeliness of the earnings announcement. The abnormal return reaction was 
significantly greater (lower) for firms that announced earlier (later). In the study, the 
authors divided the sample of firms into three groups: those that announce early, those 
that announce on-time, and those that announce late. Correlating these sub-samples to 
bad news vs. good news resulted in six groups. Controlling for earnings forecast error, 
they tested the abnormal returns surrounding the announcement date. The data used in 
the study included quarterly and annual earnings announcements. To control for the 
variation between quarterly announcements and annual announcements, the authors used 
the number of days between the announcement date and the period end date in their time 
series analysis. The median date for each firm was used to compute the early (late) 
timing. The market reaction, after controlling for earnings forecast error, was the same 
for all firms regardless of firm size, whether the firm reported good (bad) news, used 
annual vs. quarterly announcement, or contained moderately good (bad) news. 
Zeghal(1984) used a sample of quarterly and annual earnings announcements for 
1,402 companies between 1973 and 1975. The results indicate that earlier information 
has greater usefulness to stakeholders. Usefulness was estimated by calculating abnormal 
returns associated with the earnings announcement dates. 
Atiase et al. (1989), using a sample of 8,320 annual earnings announcements 
between 1975 and 1984, found that large firms tend to announce their earnings earlier 
than small firms and the market reaction was less for the large firms. The authors 
hypothesized a relationship between the timeliness of the earnings announcement and the 
market reaction to the announcement. Controlling for firm size, the length of 
announcement delay was inversely related to the size of the market reaction. 
In a theoretical paper, Gennotte and Trueman (1 996) researched the timing of 
disclosures in more detail by researching the time of day the disclosure was made and the 
subsequent market reaction. The authors conclude that there should be a greater market 
reaction for disclosures made during the trading day than for disclosures made after the 
market has closed. 
Penman (1984) found that investment strategies using the announcement dates of 
firms could produce abnormal returns to investors. Penman used a sample of 2,327 
annual and quarterly earnings announcements to test the hypothesis that an investment 
strategy based upon the earnings release timing could result in abnormal returns. The 
results indicate that short positions taken on companies reporting late experienced 
abnormal returns. The abnormal returns were larger for small firms and greater abnormal 
returns were experienced for longer delays. Additionally, the research indicates that long 
positions taken prior to an early announcement would also have produced abnormal 
returns. 
Sinclair and Young (1991) also found that abnormal returns could be obtained by 
using an investment strategy based upon the timing of the earnings announcement. 
Sinclair and Young used a sample of 1,110 half yearly earnings announcements between 
1982 and 1988 for Australian firms. The authors hypothesized that results found by US 
researchers would be the same using Australian firms. They found that while the reaction 
was slightly less than the reactions reported in US firms, they did find that firms that 
report early generally have good news to report, and that abnorn~al returns around the 
announcement date were associated with unexpected changes in earnings per share. 
However, Sinclair and Young found no evidence of market reaction to timeliness of 
reporting as reported by Kross and Schroeder (1 984) when controlling for the information 
content of the earnings announcement. 
Chambers and Penman (1984) used a sample of 2,756 annual and quarterly 
earnings announcements over the period of 1970 to 1976. Their findings show an inverse 
relationship between size and announcement timing (large firms announce earlier), and 
smaller firms have a greater market reaction to earnings announcements. Chambers and 
Penman also found that early announcements generally indicate good news and late 
announcements generally report bad news. The market also reacts negatively to late 
announcements before the reports are issued. Chambers and Penman theorize that the 
market was anticipating bad news. 
Givoly and Palmon (1 982) in their study of earnings announcements found that 
bad news delays were significant but the relationship was not a strong one. They used a 
sample of 2,836 firm years between 1960 and 1974 to test trends and attributes of 
companies that could affect the timeliness of company filings. The market reaction to the 
later announcements was very small. The conclusion was that the longer the delay in 
making earnings announcements the more information is obtained from other sources and 
integrated into stock prices before the announcement date. 
Easton and Zmijewski (1993) used a sample of 76,866 lOK reports and 193,283 
10-Q reports from 1962 to 1985. They researched 10K and 10-Q filings, prior to 
EDGAR, and found that firms did not delay bad news or present good news early in 
annual or quarterly filings as found by Chambers and Penman (1 984). Easton and 
Zmijewski state that most reports were filed close to the filing deadline and left no room 
for delay. They conclude that the timing issue described by Chambers and Penman must 
be limited to earnings announcements. 
Asthana and Balsam (200 1) examined the effect of the SEC website EDGAR on 
information distribution. Using a sample of 195 randomly selected firms, they collected 
filing dates from 1993 to 1997. Prior to EDGAR, market reaction to annual report filings 
was not possible because the distribution of data required such a long period that it 
permitted many other events to pollute the results. Using a sample of firms that are first 
time filers on EDGAR, Asthana and Balsam found both a volume and price reaction to 
1OK's filed on EDGAR and consistent with prior literature, there was no reaction to 
filings made before EDGAR. 
Griffin (2003), using a sample of 10,805 10K filings and 52,262 10-Q filings, 
examined market reactions to corporate filings on the SEC EDGAR website. His results 
indicate that the market reacts to quarterly and annual filings. Firms with large 
institutional investor holdings and larger firms experience lower market reactions, and 
there was no significant reaction to the magnitude of accounting accruals. For the 
accruals portion of his research Griffin used net income from continuing operations less 
operating cash flow deflated by stockholder equity. Griffin further finds that the market 
response increased over the study period (1996 to 2001). 
Han and Wild (1 997) examined how earnings announcement timing effected 
member firms in the same industry, an intra-industry information transfer. They used a 
sample of 1,418 firm quarter earnings announcements between 1984 and 1986 to test the 
hypothesis that the timeliness of a firm's earnings announcement has an effect on the 
stock price of other firms in the industry. Their research showed that there was 
information transfer between firms in the same industry. Firms that release information 
early have an effect on the share price of other firms in the industry that have not released 
earnings information. Subsequent industry earnings announcements have an effect on 
only industry firms that have not yet released earnings information. Both the sign and the 
magnitude of the reaction vary with the timing of the announcements. 
Summary of Timeliness Literature 
Chai and Tung (2002) found earnings management present in companies making 
earnings announcements five days later than the prior year. Chambers and Penman 
(1984) found that earnings announcements are made at traditional time periods following 
the fiscal year. Chambers and Penman (1984) and Chai and Tung (2002) used earnings 
announcement dates. However, earnings announcements do not contain the information 
necessary to calculate the presence of abnormal accruals indicating earnings 
management. 
While companies have discretion over the time to file, several attributes have 
been associated with the timeliness of filing. The company characteristics associated 
with variability in timeliness are: 
1) company size (Dyer and McHugh 1975), 
2) company year end (Dyer and McHugh 1975), 
3) extremes in financial performance (Dyer and McHugh 1975), 
4) change in auditors (Davies and Whittred 1980), 
5) audit complexity (Givoly and Palmon 1982), 
6) industry (Ashton et al. 1989), 
7) net operating losses (Ashton et al. 1989), 
8) the presence of extraordinary items (Bamber et al. 1993), and 
9) qualified audit opinions (Bamber et al. 1993). 
The early studies reviewed in this section examined timeliness of filing dates. 
The later studies examined the timeliness of company earnings announcements. While 
the current study focuses on company filing dates, factors that affect the timeliness of 
earnings announcements have the potential to affect the timeliness of the annual report 
filing. 
Delays in receiving audit opinions could affect the timeliness of annual filings. 
Keller (1986) found audit delay associated with the annual report'dates providing 
evidence that factors that affect audit delay need to be controlled in a study of the 
timeliness of annual report filings. 
In summary this section has highlighted firm characteristics that are related to 
timeliness of company filings and earnings announcements in prior research (Dyer and 
McHugh 1975; Chambers and Penman 1984; Bamber et al. 1993). The current study is 
testing Trueman's theory that moving earnings from one period to another period 
(earnings management) requires time. The literature presented in this literature review 
indicates company characteristics which have been reported to have an affect on annual 
report timing and must be controlled for in the current study. The literature also indicates 
that management has discretion over the timing of earnings announcements and statutory 
filings (Chambers and Penman 1984). 
Earnings Management 
Buckrnaster (2001) presents a history of the extant literature on income smoothing 
dating from 1893. Income smoothing is the manipulation of earnings to even out 
reported earnings over time, and may be achieved by the discretionary use of accounting 
estimates, or changes in accounting estimates to affect a firm's net income. As data 
availability and statistical methods have improved, researchers my now examine earnings 
management. 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) defined earnings management as managers using 
judgment in reporting and structuring transactions to mislead stakeholders or influence a 
particular outcome. Dechow and Skinner (2000) suggest that earnings management is 
intentional, deliberate misstatement or omission, otherwise known as fraud. 
Trueman's (1 990) theory suggests that earnings management is the results of 
firms releasing earnings reports later than expected. Trueman presents two explanations 
for his theory: 1) firms adjust their earnings to reduce an unfavorable result, or 2) firms 
observe the results from other firms in the industry and then adjust their results 
accordingly. 
The body of literature on earnings management has grown in the past decade as 
indicated by the increase in the number of studies published in this area. Events of the 
past three years (Enron, Worldcom, etc.) have increased visibility of the topic. Lynn 
Turner, as chief accountant of the SEC, (Turner and Godwin 1999) called for more 
research in earnings management to help the SEC. Healy and Wahlen (1999) review 
earnings management literature and conclude that the earnings management literature has 
mostly focused on understanding if and why earnings management exists. They conclude 
that more studies are needed in the pervasiveness of earnings management and what 
weaknesses are being exploited by company management to manipulate earnings. 
The research described in Healy and Wahlen (1999) tested for the existence of 
earnings management by examining firm or industry characteristics that may lead to 
earnings management. An example of this research is DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994). 
DeFond and Jiambalvo studied 94 firms between 1985 and 1988 that were approaching 
debt covenant violations. They hypothesized that firms close to debt covenant violations 
would be more likely to engage in earnings management to avoid the debt violation. This 
work was supported by the earlier work of Healy and Palepu (1990), in which they 
studied 126 firms with dividend covenant restrictions between the time period 198 1 and 
1985. They found these dividend covenant restrictions were effective in controlling 
management decisions. 
Jaggi and Lee (2002) divided financially distressed firms into two groups, those 
with debt covenant waivers and those firms without such waivers. The results suggest 
that firms manage earnings upward if they have obtained waivers. Jaggi and Lee studied 
135 firms that experienced either a violation of debt restrictions or a debt restructuring 
between the time period 1989 and 1996. They concluded that firms that have not 
obtained waivers manage earnings downward. This study offers support that 
management choices affect earnings management. 
Agency theory indicates management would have an interest in attaining certain 
goals. Work in this area includes several studies researching management compensation. 
In one of the earliest earnings management studies Healy (1985) found that management 
has incentives to make accounting choices that increase management bonuses. Healy 
used a sample of 1,527 firm year observations2 for 94 firms. Healy also noted that 
executives manipulate income downward when their bonuses are at the maximum payout. 
Holthausen et al. (1 995) extended the Healy study using a confidential data set of 443 
firm years of executive bonus plans, and found that managers manipulate earnings to 
obtain bonuses. Guidry, Leone, at a1 (1999) tested the results from Healy's study using 
unit level data from one company. The data used comprised bonus information from 
over 100 separate business units of a single company for the years 1993 to 1995. Guidry 
A firm year observation is an observation for one fm for one year. 
et al. found similar results; divisional managers manipulated the earnings of their 
respective divisions to reach bonus targets. 
The relationship between management compensation and earnings management 
has been established and extended in additional studies. Using a sample of 3,439 firm 
years between 1980 and 1993, Balsam (1 998) reported that managers use discretionary 
accruals to manipulate executive compensation; income increasing accruals were more 
significant when tested against executive cash compensation. Balsam found that 
executive cash compensation was related to discretionary accruals. He further found that 
discretionary accruals which assisted a company in avoiding or reducing a loss were 
significantly related to executive cash compensation. 
Payne and Robb (2000) studied whether firms manage earnings to meet or exceed 
analysts forecasts using an industry abnormal accruals method. Using a sample of 13,532 
firm year observations between 1986 and 1997, they hypothesized that firms manage 
earnings to meeting or beating analyst forecasts. Payne and Robb found evidence that 
management's incentives to meet or beat analyst's forecasts were associated with 
earnings management. 
Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) studied firms with sell or buy recommendations 
from analyst. Using a sample of 22,173 firm quarters between 1985 and 1998 the authors 
examined earnings management behavior differences between firms with high and low 
stock price sensitivity. They defined high stock price sensitivity as companies with a 
high price earnings ratio or a high market to book ratio. The authors found that firms 
with sell recommendations engaged, ex post, in income increasing earnings management, 
while firms with buy recommendations engaged in income decreasing earnings 
management. 
Other studies examine losses and earnings declines. For example, Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1 997) used a sample of 64,466 firm year observations between 1977 and 
1994 to study whether firms manage company earnings to avoid earnings decreases or 
losses. Their results suggest that firms do avoid losses and earnings declines by earnings 
management. 
Dutta and Gigler (2002) extended this research by including management 
earnings forecasts. Dutta and Gigler's results suggest that, when management is asked to 
forecast earnings, there is less earnings management. Management forecasts were further 
studied by Jaggi and Sannella (1 995) using a sample of 274 management forecasts from 
1979 to 1988, these authors examine relationship between management forecasts and 
earnings management. Their results indicate that managers use discretionary accounting 
choices to meet management forecasts. These results were confirmed by Kasznik (1999), 
who used a sample of 499 firm years for 366 firms between 1987 and 1991. The 44 
percent of the sample, management had overestimated earnings the authors also report a 
significant presence of abnormal accruals that were positively associated with 
overestimated forecasts. 
Matsumoto (2002) found evidence that management was motivated to manage 
earnings to avoid negative earnings surprises. Using a sample of 29,460 firm years fiom 
1985 to 1997, Matsumoto hypothesized that management is motivated to manage 
earnings when the firm has high institutional investment, high growth prospects, and high 
litigation risks. 
In an additional earnings management study, Degeorge et al. (1 999) suggest that 
management has incentive to adjust earnings to exceed three thresholds. The three 
thresholds are to: (1) report positive earnings, (2) sustain recent performance, and (3) 
meet analysts' forecasts. For a sample of 5,387 firms for the years 1974 to 1984, the 
authors found support for each of the hypotheses. 
Additional evidence is presented in research on initial public offerings (IPO) and 
their effect on earnings management. Researchers have hypothesized that company 
management has the incentive to manage earnings upward prior to initial public 
offerings. Aharony et al. (1993) examined earnings management prior to IPOs. Their 
results found little evidence of earnings management except in small and highly 
leveraged firms. The sample consisted of 229 industrial firms offering IPOs between 
1985 and 1987. This evidence was extended by other researchers (Teoh, Welch, and 
Wong 1998a; DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 2001) finding similar results. 
DuCharme et al. (2001) examined whether firms manipulate earnings upward 
prior to an IPO. Using a sample of 17 1 IPOs from 1982 to 1987, their findings indicate 
that company management is motivated to increase the pre-IPO earnings to realize larger 
offering proceeds. The authors further conclude that this manipulation could be 
responsible for subsequent firm under performance. 
Teoh et al. (1998a) used 1,526 IPOs from 1975 to 1984 in their study and found 
earnings management present in company filings prior to IPO offerings supporting 
Ducharme et al. (2001). However, Teoh et al. also segregated the IPO firms into 
quartiles based upon the quantity of the abnormal accruals. Firms in the first (fourth) 
quartile, representing the highest (lowest) abnormal accruals, had the worst (best) returns 
over the subsequent three years. Firms in the fourth quartile were also more likely to 
issue seasoned equity offering twenty percent more often than the first quartile firms. 
Teoh et al. (1 998b) found evidence of earnings management in firms prior to a 
seasoned public offering in their study of seasoned IPO firms. They used a sample of 
6,386 equity offerings between 1970 and 1989. They also found that firms engaging in 
earnings management prior to the public offering experienced poor stock performance for 
the three years subsequent to the public offering date. Rangan (1998) used a sample of 
230 seasoned public offerings from 1987 to 1990. Rangan hypothesized and found 
support firms that manage earnings prior to seasoned equity offerings experience poor 
performance subsequent to the offering and that managed earnings are not sustainable. 
While the IPO research has shown evidence of income increasing earnings 
management, other studies have found incentive for earnings management that decreases 
earnings. Perry and Williams (1 994) study management buyouts, using a sample of 175 
firms between 198 1 and 1988. Their results indicate that prior to a management buyout, 
company managers engaged in earnings management that decreases income. These 
findings were supported by Wu (1997), using a sample of 87 management buyouts 
between 1980 and 1987, Wu's study expands the prior research by testing third party 
takeover mergers. He found support for the hypothesis that no income decreasing 
earnings management would be found in non-management buyout firms. He concludes 
that management has the incentive to manipulate earnings prior to a management 
takeover to reduce the price that management pays for the outstanding stock. In contrast, 
management does not have the incentive when the purchaser is a third party. 
Erickson and Wang (1999) examined earnings management by acquiring firms in 
mergers and acquisitions. They used a sample of 78 that firms negotiated mergers 
between 1985 and 1990, and found that managers use earnings management to increase 
stock values prior to stock for stock mergers to reduce the acquisition price of target 
firms. 
Another area of earnings management research examines the political cost 
hypothesis which has been defined as firms taking steps to reduce costs associated with 
legislative or legal actions. Cahan et al. (1997) examined chemical firms when the U.S. 
Congress was considering the superfund legislation, and found evidence that chemical 
companies used income-decreasing accruals to reduce company profitability prior to final 
legislative action. The authors used a sample of 43 firms that had potential exposure to 
the superfhd legislation. The results of their research indicates that these firms used 
income reducing earnings management techniques in 1979, the year of the legislation, but 
not in 1978 or 1980. Additional income-decreasing accrual use timed to legislation was 
found by Key (1997), studied 24 publicly traded firms in the cable industry. Key 
hypothesized these firms used income decreasing earnings management during a period 
when the U.S. Congress was considering legislative action which would reduce the firm's 
financial appearance so they could claim to be an industry suffering a financial downturn 
and ask congress to take pity on the poor companies. 
To support an industry argument of unfair trading practices, Rayburn and Lenway 
(1992) found income decreasing earnings management present in the semiconductor 
industry at a time when the industry was filing briefs with the Department of Commerce 
to argue unfair trade practices by overseas competitors. The industry and the Department 
of Commerce argued that the semiconductor industry was harmed by unfair practices of 
Japanese firms. The authors also compared the results to the computer industry to insure 
the results were not caused by a recessionary downturn. 
In a similar study, Jones (1 991) found earnings management among firms during 
import relief hearings before the International Trade Commission. The use of accounting 
information to determine if an industry is harmed provides great incentive for 
management to manipulate results. Using 23 firms from five industries that filed for 
trade relief between 1980 and 1985, Jones found evidence to support her hypothesis that 
these firms managed their earnings downward. 
Hall and Starnrnerjohan (1997) found income decreasing earnings management 
for the oil industry when testing against periods when the individual firms faced 
litigation. Using 20 oil firms between the years 1974 and 1992, the authors tested six 
firms that faced individual litigation against the industry. The results found that these six 
firms used income decreasing earnings management in the year that the firms faced 
litigation. 
Han and Wang (1 998) also examined at the oil industry but used the Gulf War as 
the source of the political costs. In this study, the authors used 76 companies from the 
petroleum industry and the petroleum refining industry, and their results indicate that the 
oil companies used income-decreasing accruals to reduce the political costs connected 
with profiteering from increases in oil prices connected with the war. 
These previous studies all used one industry to test a relationship between 
earnings management and the political cost hypothesis. Cahan (1992), using the political 
cost hypothesis, tested across industries in a study of 48 companies subject to Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) scrutiny regarding monopolistic practices. The political cost 
hypothesis was supported indicating that firms used income-decreasing accruals during 
the periods of review by the FTC. 
This stream of literature supports the view that management engages in earnings 
management in the presence of an incentive. Incentives found to be significant for 
company management to manipulate earnings include: I) management compensation, 2) 
company losses, 3) analyst forecasts, 4) management forecasts, 5) debt covenants, 6) 
initial public offerings, 7) management buyouts, 8) firm acquisitions, and 9) political 
costs avoidance. 
Beneish (1999) provides some insight into consequences of managers engaging in 
earnings management. The Beneish study investigated firms subject to SEC enforcement 
actions or litigation. In a sample of 36 firms that were the subject of class action lawsuits 
regarding earnings overstatements, the results of the research suggest that manager 
employment losses (management turnover) were not larger for firms overstating income 
prior to SEC enforcement than for control firms. The SEC was also not likely to enforce 
monetary penalties unless the managers sold shares prior to the discovery of the income 
overstatement. Beneish suggests that neither employment loss potential or SEC penalties 
are sufficient to keep managers from overstating company income when it benefits the 
managers. 
Market Reaction to Earnings Management 
Several studies have examined the market reaction to earnings management. 
Sloan (1 996), using a sample of 40,679 firm years from 1962 to 199 1 found that the 
market did not recognize earnings management. Sloan hypothesized that the market 
fixates on earnings and not the underlying information from financial statements. His 
results indicate that the market misprices stocks as a result of the earnings management. 
Subramanyam (1 996) expanded the Sloan (1 996) study results. The purpose of 
the expansion was to test whether the Sloan findings could be explained by income 
smoothing. Using a sample of 2 1,135 firm years from 1973 to 1993 Subramnayam 
concludes that the earnings management found by Sloan is not earnings manipulation but 
management's efforts to smooth earnings. Subrarnnayam admits that sensitivity tests fail 
to rule out the possibility the results could be from earnings manipulation. 
Xie (2001) extended this research using a sample of 56,692 firm years between 
1971 and 1992. Xie found that, not only did the market fail to recognize the earnings 
management, the market over priced the results. In additional testing, Xie further 
decomposed accruals into abnormal accruals and normal accruals. Subsequent analysis 
indicates that the market is pricing not only the normal accruals, but also the abnormal 
(discretionary) accrual components of income. 
Collins and Hribar (2000) replicated the Sloan (1996) study using 41,237 firm 
quarters between 1988 and 1997. They extended Sloan's work to determine if the 
overpricing was the result of post-earnings announcement drift. Their results indicate 
that their results are separate from post-earnings announcement drift. 
Extending the research on market reaction to earnings management, Balsam et al. 
(2002) further researched quarterly 10-Q filing dates. Starting with 37,708 firm-quarter 
observations between 1996 and 1998, the authors restricted the firm-quarter observations 
used in the study to: 1) firms with a December year-end, 2) quarterly earnings exactly 
met or exceeded analyst forecast by one cent, 3) the absolute value of unexpected 
discretionary accruals was at least one percent of total assets, 4) the 10-Q was filed within 
45 days of the quarter end, and 5) the 10-Q filing date was at least 12 trading days after 
the earnings announcement dates. These restrictions reduced their final sample to 61 3 
firm quarters. The authors hypothesize that the use of earnings filing dates is the 
appropriate period to test for earnings management because the information required to 
recognize earnings management is not available until the financials are filed. Using event 
methodology with a long event window, Balsam et al. found that the market recognizes 
abnormal accruals and reacts negatively to their presence. The results were greater (more 
stock price movement) when using institutional investors as a proxy for sophisticated 
investors. A limitation of this study was the use of a sample that contained only firms 
suspected of engaging in earnings management. This limitation leaves open a question: if 
firms not suspected of managing earnings were included in the test, would the results still 
indicate market recognition? 
Chai and Tung (2002), using a sample of 10,503 firm year observations between 
1991 and 1994, found earnings management present in firms announcing earnings 5 days 
later than the previous year. They speculated that late announcers wait to see the results 
announced by other firms in the industry, and then manipulate their earnings accordingly. 
Additional evidence of the market mispricing accruals is supported by studies 
from Teoh et a1 (1 998a and 1998b) and Rangan (1 998). In Teoh et al. (1998b) the 
authors test for earnings management in seasoned equity offerings. After finding 
abnormal accruals present before the offering, they further test for a market reaction. 
They find that the market prices the offerings based on the manipulated results and the 
market fails to adjust for the overstated earnings. Teoh et al. (1998a) replicates the study 
using initial public offerings. In both studies the authors conclude that the abnormal 
accruals prior to the offering and the overpricing of these accruals lead to the under 
performance of these offerings in subsequent years after the offering. Rangan (1998) also 
used seasoned equity offerings to conclude that the market temporarily overprices stocks 
based upon earnings management present in the financial reports issued prior to the 
public offering. 
Earnings Management Methodology 
The earnings management methodology continues to evolve. As shown by the 
research on IPOs, advances in methodology have produced additional results. Early 
research by Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) focused earnings management research 
on observing abnormal accruals. The early methodology used to study earnings 
management measures total accruals and then decomposes the total accruals into two 
parts: normal accruals and discretionary accruals. Abnormal accruals are defined as 
accrual amounts in excess of the industry average. DeChow et al. (1995) present 
evidence that a modified version of a model used by Jones (1991) provides the better 
results in a test for abnormal accruals. This Modified Jones Model uses balance sheet 
data to make the estimates of abnormal accruals. Hribar and Collins (2002) presented 
evidence that the Modified Jones Model is biased for firms with merger activity and 
presented a model that eliminates this bias using data from the cash flow statement. 
Other researchers have employed methods other than the abnormal accrual 
models. However, the vast majority of the earnings management literature of the last 
decade focuses on the use of abnormal accruals methodology. Examples of research 
using accruals other than abnormal accruals from industry averages include Bauman et al. 
(2001) which studies deferred tax expense accrual for earnings management, a method 
also used by Phillips et al. (2003). Both of these studies found evidence that firms 
manage earnings in methods that do not increase income taxes, thus increasing the 
deferred tax expense amounts. 
Additional authors have employed methodologies relating to characteristics 
specific to certain industries. Examples of research using industry characteristics include 
Mensah et al. (1994) who examined characteristics specific to the health care industry. 
Additional research by Ahrned et al. (1 999), Bhat (1996), and Robb (1 998) examined 
loan loss reserves in the banking industry. 
Summary of Earnings Management Literature 
The vast majority of earnings management research has used methods to 
segregate abnormal accruals from total accruals. The model used in recent literature, the 
cash flow variant of the Modified Jones Model (Hribar and Collins 2002) has evolved 
from earlier attempts to measure abnormal accruals. 
Earnings management issues have existed in the literature for over a century 
(Buckmaster 2001). Research to date has found that earnings management occurs when 
management has an incentive to change reported earnings. Incentives that have been 
found associated with earnings management include management compensations, analyst 
forecasts, avoidance of losses and earnings declines, IPOs, and political costs. 
Prior research has tested events where the authors have theorized that there is 
sufficient incentive for earnings management to be present. The research to date has 
found the presence of earnings management but not how to control earnings management 
(Healy and Wahlen 1999). Benish (1999) found that SEC enforcement actions fail to 
control earnings management. Trueman (1990) theorized that time is required to manage 
earnings. If earnings management requires time as theorized, then the SEC's reduction in 
the time to file annual and quarterly reports could reduce the amount of earnings 
management. 
Several studies have examined the market reaction to earnings management. The 
study by Sloan (1 996) found that the market did not recognize earnings management and 
mispriced stocks as a result of the earnings management. These results are also 
supported by Subramanyam (1996). Xie (2001) expanded this research and found that 
not only did the market fail to recognize the earnings management, the market over 
priced the results. A study by Collins and Hribar (2000) expanded the research of Sloan 
by utilizing quarterly filing dates found similar results. However, Balsam et al. (2002) 
found that the market reacted negatively to earnings management at 10-Q and 1 OK filing 
dates. They found higher significant when using a proxy for sophisticated investors. The 
results of Sloan, Xie, and Collins and Hribar indicates that the market over prices 
abnormal accruals in the long-term but the results of Balsam et al. indicates that the 
market recognizes earnings management in the short term. 
The Balsam et al. (2002) study used a small sample of firms (6 13 firm quarters) 
that were suspected of engaging in earnings management. It is unknown if the results 
found by Balsam et al. could be indicated for a larger sample including firms not 
suspected of engaging in earnings management. If the results hold true, this adds 
additional evidence of the myopic nature of the market. 
Literature Review Summary 
Trueman (1 990) theorized that earnings management delayed firm reporting. The 
author proposed two scenarios for this possibility: 1) firms need time to adjust their 
results to cover unfavorable company results, or 2) firms wait until others in the industry 
have announced earnings and adjust their earnings accordingly. This second proposition 
is supported by Chai and Tung (2002) who found earnings management present in firms 
that announced results five days later than the prior year. Chai and Tung propose that the 
cause of these findings is that firms wait to see the results of other firms before adjusting 
(manipulating) their own results. 
Givoly and Palmon (1 982) conclude that companies file annual reports at 
traditional time periods. If earnings management delays reporting as theorized by 
Trueman (1980), then controlling for other delay factors, late deviations from the 
traditional filing dates could be the result of management manipulating earnings. 
Prior researchers have stated that, assuming the efficient market hypothesis holds, 
the market already has absorbed most of the information contained in earnings 
announcements prior to the release of the data. Ball and Kothari (1991) state that routine 
earnings announcements resolve some uncertainty and that this increase in information 
produces some volatility surrounding the announcement date. Bartov et al. (2002) found 
positive market returns for firms that meet or exceed analyst forecasts. Payne and Robb 
(2000) found firms manage earnings upward to meet analyst forecasts. These studies 
provide a theoretical basis for the concept that the market could over price abnormal 
accruals. 
Contrary to studies by Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001), Balsam et al. (2002) found 
the market reacts negatively to earnings management at the 10-Q filings dates. Balsam et 
al. state that these results are limited because their sample consisted only of firms 
suspected of engaging in earnings management. 
Previous research provides a foundation for the current study. As indicated in the 
prior literature, ,several issues are pertinent to this study. From the timeliness literature it 
has been shown that company management has discretion over the timing of the release 
of information and that companies release information at traditional time periods. Also 
indicated in the timeliness literature are items that have been found to be associated with 
delays in timiig. These items: 1) company size, 2) company year end, 3) change in 
auditors, 4) audit complexity, proxied by industry or inventory to asset ratio, 5) the 
presence of extraordinary items, 6) net operating losses, 7) qualified audit opinions, 8) 
industry, and 9) extremes in financial performance must be controlled for in research 
regarding timeliness. 
The prior research on earnings management has found that company management 
is motivated to manage earnings to reach specific goals. Included in these goals is the 
expectation to meet or exceed analyst forecasts of company earnings. Researchers to date 
have not been able to identifjr methods to control or limit earnings management by firm 
management. Research has in fact shown that SEC enforcement actions are not sufficient 
to limit earnings management. The research has shown that additional research is needed 
to isolate methods to reduce earnings management. 
The market recognition of earnings management literature has left contradictory 
evidence. Sloan, Xie and others have found that the market does not recognize earnings 
management while Balsam et al. found that the market does recognize earnings 
management. 
The current study provides a foundation to test Trueman's theory that earnings 
management requires time. Companies have a limited time to make earnings 
announcements and statutory filings. If Trueman's theory of the timeliness of earnings 
management is supported, then the reduction of the allowed time to file annual and 
quarterly reports mandated by the SEC should reduce earnings management. 
CHAPTER I11 
THEORY AND RESEARCH METHODS 
Annual Report Timeliness 
Trueman (1990) theorized that time is required to shift earnings from one period 
to another, earnings management. Trueman concludes by stating that the potential exists 
for this theory to be empirically tested. Trueman's theory presents a research question of: 
does earnings management require time? If earnings management requires time as 
theorized, then the SEC regulatory change regarding the reduction of time to file 1OK 
reports should reduce firm ability to manage earnings. 
Alford et al. (1 994) found that most companies were able to file before the 90-day 
limit but many did not. The authors present no evidence regarding why companies 
delayed the 10K filing. The authors speculate that one possible reason is company 
tradition. Givoly and Palmon (1982) also state that one contributing factor to the 
timeliness of filing was company tradition. Because most firms were able to file before 
90 days and choose not to, the authors speculate that firm tradition dictates the timeliness 
of filing. If companies engage in earnings management irregularly, then deviations from 
the company traditional filing date could indicate a deviation fiom normal earnings 
reporting and indicate earnings management, after controlling for other factors that have 
been found associated with filing delays in prior studies. 
In a pre-EDGAR study, Easton and Zmijewski (1 993) found that company filings 
were made close to the filing deadline and left little time for delay. Asthana and Balsam 
(2001) note that firms filing on EDGAR have reduced the time to file their annual 
reports. If the timeliness theory is correct then controlling for other delay factors, 
deviations from the company traditional filing time could indicate earnings management. 
To test Trueman's theory, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H 1 : Firms that file 1 OK reports later than the normal company traditional 
filing date have income increasing earnings management present. 
Firms not engaging in earnings management should have consistent nuniber of 
days to file; a company traditional filing date (Chambers and Penman 1984; Alford et al. 
1994). Companies filing later than the traditional filing date, barring extraordinary 
events, should present evidence of earnings management, a significant relationship 
between abnormal accruals and deviations from the traditional filing date. A minimum of 
five years of company filing dates is used to establish the company meanlmedian filing 
date. This meadmedian filing date is used as the company traditional filing date. The 
difference between the traditional filing date and the actual filing date are deviations from 
the traditional date. It is hypothesized that there will be a positive relationship between 
abnormal accruals (income increasing earnings management) and this timing difference. 
Companies file annual reports at traditional time periods (Chambers and Penman 
1984). Chambers and Penman (1 984) found the standard deviation of annual earnings 
announcements to be one week. Firms that file their annual reports consistently should 
have a standard deviation of one to two days. Thus a firm with a standard deviation of 1 
day that filed a report 3 days later than normal (a weekend delay) would be incorrectly 
included in the firms suspected of earnings management. After calculating the standard 
deviations for the entire sample and for individual industries, additional tests are run 
testing companies filing outside the sample standard deviation. This adds an additional 
segregation between firms suspected of using earnings management and firms not 
suspected of using earnings management. 
Chai and Tung (2002) found earnings management present in firms that 
announced earnings 5 days later than prior years. They speculate that firms wait to hear 
other company announcements before manipulating their results. To test this, tests are 
run for firms filing five days later than the company's previous year's filing date. 
Firth (1 976) found an intra-industry effect in the market reaction to earnings . 
Ashton et al. (1989) found an intra-industry effect in market reaction to earnings 
announcements. Based on this intra-industry effect, a test is also run for companies filing 
later than the industry meanlmedian filing date of the current year to test the intra- 
industry effect. 
Company characteristics which have been identified in prior research that 
significantly relate to timeliness of filing are used as control variables in this study. The 
control variables used are: (1) log of total assets (size), (2) a dummy variable for firms 
with a December or January year-end (busy season audits), (3) a dummy variable for 
firms that change auditors (audit delay factor), (4) a dummy variable for the presence of 
an extraordinary item (audit delay factor), (5) a dummy variable for negative net income 
(bad news), (6) a dummy variable for qualified audit opinion (bad news and audit delay), 
(7) two digit SIC code (industry and audit complexity) and (8) a dummy variable for high 
distress (extreme financial performance). 
A positive relationship between an annual report filed outside the firms traditional 
meadmedian filing period and abnormal accruals provides support for the theory that 
earnings management requires time. Support for this theory provides support for the 
concept that the SEC reduction in time to file can help reduce earnings management. 
Alford et al. (1994) examined firms that file SEC form 10K after the statutory 
filing period of 90 days. Using a sample of 38,775 10K filings from 7,887 firms between 
1978 and 1985, the authors found that 20% of firms missed the statutory filing date. 
Further examination revealed common characteristics for late filers. In particular, late 
filers are not random but are generally small, have negative earnings changes, low 
liquidity, high leverage, and experience negative market reactions. The majority of these 
firms also have experienced some unfavorable economic event. Earnings management 
has been found to be associated with both preventing negative earnings changes and 
preventing negative market reactions in prior research. 
The Alford et al. (1994) study found that the market reacted negatively to firms 
that filed later than the statutory deadline. The "big bath" theory (Healy 1985) suggests 
that firms that cannot manage earnings upward to reach the next target earnings number 
should "clean" the financial statement of earnings management. This removal of 
abnormal accruals from the financial statements allows future income increasing earnings 
management (abnormal accruals) to meet future financial goals. This would suggest that 
since these firms are going to be punished by the market (experience negative returns) for 
filing subsequent to the statutory period, the firm should remove the earnings 
management recorded on the books to allow future reserves to be created. Therefore, 
firms filing later than 90 days should exhibit income decreasing abnormal accruals. 
Thus, hypothesis two: 
H2: Firms that file their annual report later than the statutory 90 days have 
income decreasing abnormal accruals. 
Supporting this expectation of income decreasing abnormal accruals, Chai and 
Tung (2002) found income decreasing earnings management present in late announcers. 
Hence, firms filing subsequent to the statutory filing date should also have the presence 
of income decreasing abnormal accruals. 
Firms selected as filing after the statutory filing dates are firms that file their 1 OK 
forms later than 93 days from the end of their fiscal yearend. Ninety-three days is used 
instead of 90 days to allow for weekend and holidays. 
Market Reaction 
Beaver (1968) stated that while earnings convey information, there are other more 
timely sources of information that contain relatively the same information content. 
Therefore, controlling for information asymmetry, it is possible to test market reaction to 
information contained in earnings announcements or annual filings that is not available 
fiom other sources. One type of information not available at the earnings announcement 
date is abnormal accruals. 
The availability of information prior to EDGAR was not a timely process, 10K's 
were available by visiting the SEC or by writing to request a copy to be mailed. This 
slow dissemination of information produced a dispersed market reaction. Easton and 
Zmijewski (1993) found little reaction to 10K filings and they attribute this to the slow 
dissemination of information. Astana and Balsam (2001) state that this dispersed 
reaction resulted in studies such as Easton and Zmijewski (1993) finding no reaction to 
10K filings. Astana and Balsam (2001) tested market reaction to company first time 10K 
filings on EDGAR. They found market price and volume reaction at the EDGAR filing 
dates. With the advent of EDGAR, the information contained in the 1 OK is readily 
available to a large audience in a short period of time. Griffin (2003) examining market 
reaction to EDGAR report filings, reports evidence that the market reaction to EDGAR 
report filings has increased over time. 
Investors tend to "fixate" on earnings and ignore the underlying financial 
information presented to them for analysis (Sloan 1996). By managing earnings, 
company management is able to deceive investors. Prior research has shown that 
analysts and investors are not interpreting the information content of accruals and the 
earnings management reflected in the accrual numbers (Sloan 1996; Bradshaw, 
Richardson, and Sloan 2001). 
Balsam et al. (2002) found a negative market reaction to earnings announcements 
with earnings management present. If the market is efficient as theorized by financial 
researchers, there should be a negative market reaction to firms with income increasing 
earnings management. Firms which have manipulated their earnings upward to meet 
projections have created earnings that are not sustainable. The market should recognize 
this limitation and react in a negative manner. However, Griffin (2003) found no market 
reaction to total accruals (not abnormal accruals/earnings management). To address these 
contradictory findings, hypothesis 3 is proposed: 
H3: There is a negative market reaction to company filings that include high 
levels of income increasing earnings management. 
The Balsam et al. (2002) study which found a negative market reaction to firms 
suspected of engaging in earnings management, used a small sample (61 3) of firm 
quarters. The firms selected for study were only firms suspected of earnings 
management. Based on their sample restrictions they state they are unable to eliminate 
possibilities that the results could be from another explanation. Griffin (2003) did not 
test market reaction to earnings management, only total accruals. The lack of results 
noted by Griffin could be from using total accruals and not testing earnings management 
(abnormal accruals). While total accruals could be highly correlated with discretionary 
accruals, individual firm year observations could provide a different result. 
Event test methodology is used to test this hypothesis. The event used in the test 
is the date the company files the annual report on EDGAR. There should be a negative 
market reaction to firms engaging in income increasing'earnings management. The 
results of the event tests for firms with earnings management should be the same for 
companies filing later than company meadmedian and for companies filing at their 
traditional filing times. To control for the market reaction to the earnings announcement, 
the market reaction will be calculated based on a base line of six months prior to the 
earnings announcement date. 
Firms that cannot file the annual report within the statutory 90 days are required 
to file a NT 10K for a 15 day extension of time. Griffin (2003) reports a negative market 
reaction to firms filing a NT 1 OK report. The "big bath" theory would suggest that firms 
filing late may have greater income decreasing abnormal accruals. (The market is 
already going to punish these firms late and the attitude becomes one of let's clean up the 
books.) Givoly and Palmon (1982) found less market reaction to later earnings 
announcements. Givoly and Palmon conclude that the market has already absorbed 
information from other sources as the cause of the lack of reaction. The market reacts 
negatively to a NT filing; at the subsequent (late) 10K filing date there should be little, if 
any, market reaction. However, when a company files a 1 OK subsequent to a NT filing 
there should be a market reaction to firms presenting evidence of earnings management. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is presented: 
H4: Firms that file later than the statutory period and have income decreasing 
abnormal accruals present will have a negative market reaction. 
Since the market has already reacted negatively to the NT filing, there should be no 
additional market reaction to the subsequent 10K filing. 
Model design 
The research community has tested various earnings management models; 
abnormal accruals (Dechow et al. 1995), changes in deferred taxes (Bauman et al. 2001), 
and methods characteristic to certain industries. (Mensah et a1 (1 994) reviewed incurred 
but not reported expenses in HMO's). However, the most widely used method is the 
Modified Jones Model. The Modified Jones Model is a method of measuring non- 
discretionary accruals in company financial statements. The theory of the model is that 
company management uses discretionary accruals to manipulate earnings. 
Modified Jones Model 
Dechow et al. (1 995) tested four models used in previous studies to measure 
earnings management plus a modification to one of the models. The resulting five 
models tested were: 1)The Healy (1985) model, 2) The De Angelo (1986) model, 3) The 
Jones (1991) model, 4) The Industry model (Dechow and Sloan 1991), and 5) an industry 
version of the Jones model. Dechow et al. tested these five models on sample data and 
the results of the study indicate that the best and most accurate findings are obtained fiom 
a modification of the Jones model (Jones 1991), which they proposed in the 1995 paper. 
The industry version of the Modified Jones Model estimates total accruals during the 
event period. Estimates obtained from the model are then used to calculate non- 
discretionary accruals. The difference between the total accruals and non-discretionary 
accruals equals the discretionary accruals. 
Cash Flow Accruals 
Hribar and Collins (2002) present evidence that tests using accruals from the 
balance sheet (Modified Jones Model), have biased results due to the occurrence of 
mergers and acquisitions. The Dechow et al. (1995) model (Modified Jones Model) uses 
changes in the balance sheet assets and liabilities to calculate total accruals. Mergers and 
acquisitions upwardly adjust the balance sheet numbers. These upward adjustments are 
not distinguishable from earnings management by the model. Hribar and Collins suggest 
using data from the cash flow statement as a substitute in the calculation for total 
accruals. This model also picks up additional accruals not considered by the Dechow et 
al. version. An example of these additional accruals is deferred taxes which have been 
found to be used in earnings management in studies such as Phillips et al. (2003). The 
Hribar and Collins modification calculates total accruals as the difference between 
earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations and cash flow from 
operations. This calculation is free from the bias of changes in the balance sheet caused 
by mergers or acquisitions. Discretionary accruals are calculated as the residuals in the 
same manner as (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam 1998; DeFond and 
Subramanyam 1998; Francis, Maydew, and Sparks 1999; Chung and Kallapur 2003). The 
discretionary accruals are calculated using the following model: 
(Model 1) 
Where: 
ACC = Total accruals 
TA.1 = Total assets at the beginning of the year 
ASALES = The change in sales adjusted by the change in accounts receivable 
PPE = Property, plant, and equipment 
This discretionary accrual amount is the dependent variable for the testing. 
Prior research has shown several factors to be related to earnings management. 
These factors are financial health, size, and growth. Financial health is measured by 
three variables: leverage, financial distress, and cash flow. Financial distress is measured 
by the Altman z-score. Size is measured by the log of total assets and growth is proxied 
by the market to book ratio. Control variables are included to reduce the effect of these 
issues. 
Prior studies have also found a relationship between abnormal accruals and loan 
covenant violations (DeFond and Jiarnbalvo 1994) and a relationship between loan 
covenant violations and earnings management (Press and Wientrop 1990). Since high 
leverage firms are more likely to manage earnings, leverage is included as a control 
variable. LEVERAGE is measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets. Financial 
distress has been shown to promote earnings management (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and 
Skinner 1994). To control for financial distress a dummy variable is created for firms 
with an Altman z-score below 1.8 1 ; indicating financial distress (HIDIS). An additional 
dummy variable is created for low distress firms (LODIS), firms with an Altman z-score 
of above 3.0 in a similar manner to DeAngelo et al. (1994). The third financial health 
variable is cash flow. Cash flow is controlled for using log of operating cash flow. 
Larger firms have more resources available to them and have greater capabilities 
to manage earnings. Size is controlled for using the log of total assets (LNTA). Accrual 
levels can vary with the growth characteristics of a firm (Jones 199 1 ; Young 1 999). To 
control for this variation the market-to-book ratio is used as a proxy for growth (Chung 
and Kallapur 2003). 
Hypothesis one 
Hypothesis one is: 
H1: Firms that file 10K reports later than the normal company traditional 
filing date have income increasing earnings management present. 
The relationship between discretionary accruals and time in this hypothesis is tested using 
simultaneous equations analysis. The first model is defined as: 
DACC = a0 + alTIME + a2LEVERAGE + a3LODIS + a4HIDIS + asLNCASH + 
a6LNTA + a7PRICETOBOOK + E (Model 2) 
Where: 
DACC = absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated by model (1) 
TIME = time variable of interest (detailed below) 
LEVERAGE = leverage 
LODIS = low distress firms 
HIDIS = high distress firms 
LNCASH = log of cash flow from operations 
LNTA = size proxied by log of total assets 
PRICETOBOOK = market to book ratio 
The number of calendar days between the company fiscal year end and the day the annual 
report is filed with EDGAR is calculated for each firm year. The time variable of interest 
is the number of days to file an annual report for the observation less the company 
average filing days (evaluated nine different ways, described in the previous section). An 
average number of days is calculated for each companylindustry. The time variable is 
then the difference between the company findustry average and the number of days for 
the individual firm year. The average is calculated as: 
1) Firms filing later than the company mean 
2)  Firms filing later than the company median 
3) Firms filing later than the industry mean 
4) Firms filing later than the industry median 
5) Firms filing later than the sample mean 
6 )  Firms filing later than the sample median 
7 )  Firms filing more than 5 days later than the prior year 
8) Firms filing more than 5 days later than the industry mean 
9) Firms filing more than 5 days later than the industry median 
LEVERAGE is calculated as total debt divided by total assets for each firm year. To 
control for financial distress two variables are used to indicate high and low financially 
distressed firms. LODIS is a dunlrny variable with a value of one for firms with an 
Altman z-score greater than 3.0 and zero for all other firm years. HIDIS is a dummy 
variable with a value of one for firms with an Altman z-score less than 1.8 1 and a value 
of zero for all other firm years. It is hypothesized that there is a positive relationship 
between the time variable of interest and discretionary accruals. 
The discretionary accruals testing used in earnings management research uses 
discretionary accruals as the dependent variable. This type of testing attempts to find 
causation of abnormal accruals. The current research also examines explanations of the 
timeliness of annual report filing, to determine the association, if any, between earnings 
management and in the filing time of annual reports. Additional testing is conducted 
using the timeliness of filing as the dependent variable. For this testing the timeliness is 
the dependent variable, discretionary accruals is an independent variable, and the control 
variables include the factors shown in previous research to cause delay in annual filings. 
Significant results indicate that the abnormal accruals (earnings management) explain 
some timeliness of annual reports. 
The issues of delay (audit delay, and good newshad news) are included as control 
variables in this testing. Proxies for audit delay include presence of extraordinary items, 
change in auditor, busy season audits and industry (Ashton et al. 1989). A qualified or 
adverse audit opinion is also be included as an audit delay control (Keller 1986). 
Negative net income is used as a proxy for reporting bad news (Chambers and Penman 
1984). The audit delay proxies, extraordinary items, change in auditor, busy season 
audits, presence of an adverse audit opinion, and a negative net income are represented 
by a dummy variable indicating the presence of the delay factor. Other characteristics 
found to be significant in studies of the timeliness of annual filings include size and 
company yearend (Dyer and McHugh 1975). Dyer and McHugh found extremes in 
profitability to be significant in reporting delays. Whittred and Zimrner (1984) and 
Lawrence (1983) found delays for firms approaching bankruptcy. A dummy variable is 
used to represent high financial distress, firms with a z-score of less than 1.8 1. The 
resulting model for testing the timeliness of abnormal accruals (and the second equation 
for the simultaneous equations model) is: 
TIME = a0 + alDACC + a2LNTA + a3EXTRA + a4AUDCHG + asBUSY + a60PIN + 
a7NEGNI + asHIDIS + E (Model 3) 
Where: 
DACC = absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated by model (I) 
TIME = the timeliness variable of interest calculated by subtracting the number of 
days the annual report is filed with EDGAR fiom average filing number of 
days. (A positive value is a firm year filed later than the average.) 
LNTA = size proxied by the log of total assets 
EXTRA = dummy variable for the presence of an extraordinary item 
AUDCHG = dummy variable for a change in auditor fiom the prior year 
BUSY = audits conducted during the busy season 
OPIN = dummy variable representing a non-clean audit opinion 
NEGNI = a reported negative net income 
HIDIS = dummy variable for high distressed firms 
A days-to-file number is calculated for each firm year as the number of days between the 
fiscal year end and the date the annual report is filed with EDGAR. The average days to 
file is calculated for each fidindustry. The time variable of interest (TIME) is 
calculated by subtracting the meadmedian of the individual companies from the actual 
number of days to file the annual report. To control for time delays resulting from 
extraordinary items a dummy variable (EXTRA) is created with a value of one 
representing the presence of an extraordinary item in the firm year observation and a 
value of zero for other firm years. AUDCHG is included to control for a time delay 
caused by a change in firm auditors. A dummy variable is created with a value of one for 
firm years in which the auditor is different from the prior year. A value of zero is used 
for all other firm years. To control for audits conducted during the busy audit season a 
dummy variable BUSY is created with a value of one for companies with December and 
January yearends and a value of zero for all other firm years. Firms with an audit opinion 
other than a clean opinion experience filing delays. To control for this delay factor a 
dummy variable (OPIN) is included coded with a value of one for firms with an opinion 
other than a clean opinion and a value of zero for all other firm years. Firms with 
negative net incomes have been found to have delayed annual report filings. To control 
for filing delays associated with negative net income a dummy variable (NEGNI) is 
created coded with a value of one for firms years with a net income less than 0. To 
control for financial distress a dummy variable (HIDIS) is used. The dummy variable is 
coded a value of one for firms with an Altman z-score of less than 1.8 1 and a value of 
zero for all other firm years. This testing for hypothesis one is also performed using 
sample meanlmedian. 
The proposed model 2 theorizes that discretionary accruals are a function of time; 
a company that has delayed filing is managing earnings. Model 3 theorized that time is a 
function of discretionary accruals; time is required to manage earnings. 
Hypothesis two 
Hypothesis 2 states: 
H2: Firms that file their annual report later than the statutory 90 days have 
income decreasing abnormal accruals. 
Firms that file late are punished by the market (Alford et al. 1994; Griffin 2003). The big 
bath theory would indicate that firms that file their annual report after the 90 days 
statutory filing time should display income decreasing abnormal accruals. To test this 
hypothesis, the sample is segregated into firms that file timely and firms that file after the 
90 day statutory time period. A dummy variable is created for firms filing after the 90 
day statutory time period. Logit is used to estimate the following model: 
TIME = a0 + alDACC + a2LNTA + a3EXTRA + a4AUDCHG + asBUSY + 
a60PIN + a7NEGNI + asHIDIS + E (Model 4) 
Where: 
DACC = discretionary accruals calculated by model (1) 
TIME = dummy variable for filing after 90 days 
LNTA = size proxied by the log of total assets 
EXTRA = dummy variable for the presence of an extraordinary item 
AUDCHG = dummy variable for a change in auditor from the prior year 
BUSY = audits conducted during the busy season 
OPIN = dummy variable representing a non-clean audit opinion 
NEGNI = a reported negative net income 
HIDIS = dummy variable for high distressed firms 
TIME is a dummy variable coded with a value of one for firm years filed more than 93 
days after the fiscal year end and zero for all other firm years. To control for time delays 
resulting from extraordinary items a dummy variable (EXTRA) is created with a value of 
one representing the presence of an extraordinary item in the firm year observation and a 
value of zero for other firm years. AUDCHG is included to control for a time delay 
caused by a change in firm auditors. A dummy variable is created with a value of one for 
firm years in which the auditor is different from the prior year. A value of zero is used 
for all other firm years. To control for audits conducted during the busy audit season a 
dummy variable BUSY is created with a value of one for companies with December and 
January yearends and a value of zero for all other firm years. Firms with an audit opinion 
other than a clean opinion experience filing delays. To control for this delay factor a 
dummy variable (OPIN) is included coded with a value of one for firms with an opinion 
other than a clean opinion and a value of zero for all other firm years. Firms with 
negative net incomes have been found to have delayed annual report filings. To control 
for filing delays associated with negative net income a dummy variable (NEGNI) is 
created coded with a value of one for firms years with a net income less than 0. To 
control for financial distress a dummy variable (HIDIS) is used. The dummy variable is 
coded a value of one for firms with an Altman z-score of less than 1.8 1 and a value of 
zero for all other firm years. It is expected that a negative relationship exists between the 
time variable and the signed values of the discretionary accruals indicating income 
decreasing abnormal accruals present in firms filing later than the 90 day statutory period. 
Market Reaction 
The market reaction hypotheses are tested using an event methodology. Balsam 
et al. (2002) tested market reaction to earnings management contained in quarterly 10-Q 
statements. The period used for the testing in Balsam et al. was 17 days (-1, +15). They 
used this long event window subsequent to the event date because analyzing of the 
information included in the quarterly reports takes time. The testing for H3, the market 
recognition of earnings management, uses the same 17 day event window for testing. 
To remove possible seasonality from the results, only firms with December year 
ends are used in the sample for the event testing (Beaver 1968; Balsam et al. 2002). This 
limitation removed 4,758 observations from the sample. To estimate the stock return 
response to the annual report filings, this study uses the market model originally posited 
by Sharpe (1963): 
(Model 5) 
Where: 
Ri = market return for stock I 
R, = market return for index 
This model is estimated by ordinary least squares regression. The value weighted 
index return for the S&P500 is used for the index market return in this testing. The 
parameters are estimated using daily returns for 180 business days prior to the 
announcement day (days-1 81 to -1) and a minimum of 12 days is required between the 
announcement date and the subsequent annual report filing date similar to (Balsam et a1 
2002). The results of this testing provide the expected return for individual stocks. The 
residual E is computed for each stock for the event period using: 
E = Ri - (ao + al&) (Model 6) 
where a 0  and a, are obtained from the regressions of the non-event period. A positive 
residual implies a positive response and a negative residual implies a negative response. 
There is research that indicates that the market reacts to earnings announcements 
more than one day prior to the announcement date, the market reacts in anticipation of the 
earnings announcement. An additional test of this hypothesis was performed using 
parameters calculated using - 18 1 to - 10 days prior to the announcement date in an effort 
to further reduce the market reaction to the announcement date. 
Hypothesis three 
To test the association between discretionary accruals and abnormal stock returns, 
hypothesis three: 
H3: There is a negative market reaction to company filings that include high 
levels of income increasing earnings management. 
the following model is used (Balsam et al. 2002): 
(Model 7) 
Where: 
CARi = the cumulative abnormal return for stock i over the 17 day event window 
obtained from model (Model 6) 
DACC = the abnormal accruals for stock i obtained from the cash flow variant of 
the modified Jones model. (Model 2) 
LNTA = size proxied by the log of total assets 
UNEXP = unexpected earnings 
To control for market reaction to unexpected earnings a control variable UNEXP is 
included. UNEXP is a proxy for the unexpected earnings calculated as the difference 
between the earnings per share in the prior year and the earnings per share in the current 
year. The earnings per share is the earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations. Hypothesis 3 predicts a negative reaction to discretionary accruals; therefore 
a negative sign is predicted for a,  (an inverse market reaction from discretionary 
accruals); the larger the quantity of abnormal accruals the larger the negative market 
reaction. 
Balsam et al. (2002) used what they called unexpected abnormal accruals. They 
defined unexpected abnormal accruals as the difference between the abnormal accruals in 
the current quarter and the abnormal accruals in the same quarter from the previous year. 
Following this method the study also uses the difference in abnormal accruals from the 
prior year as an additional test. 
Hypothesis four 
Hypothesis 4 investigates market reaction to earnings management included in 
financial statement filings filed subsequent to the 90 day statutory filing date. The event 
window for the annual filing is the 17 day window (-1, +15) used by Balsam et al. 
(2002). Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001) used total accruals in their analysis. The results of 
the Sloan (1 996) and Xie (200 1) research indicate that the market does not react to 
earnings management. These two papers tested whether or not the market reacted to total 
accruals. The findings of both studies were that the market does not react to total 
accruals. Balsam et al. (2002) used discretionary accruals in their analysis. They tested 
for a market reaction to a change in discretionary accruals from one year to the next. The 
conflicting results from these studies could be explained by this difference. Using the 
method described above for models 5 and 6, the market reaction is determined for each 
firm. In the current study the market reaction is tested against discretionary accruals and 
unexpected discretionary accruals (change from prior year). 
Hypothesis 4 states: 
H4: Firms that file later than the statutory period and have earnings 
management present will have a negative market reaction. 
To test this hypothesis, the sample firms are divided into firms filing after the 90 day 
statutory period and firms that file timely. The group of firms that filed after the 90 day 
period is used in this testing. The resulting sample is tested using model 7. Griffin 
(2003) tested market reaction to late filings. Griffin used total accruals (net income 
before extraordinary items and discontinued operations less cash flow from operations) as 
used by Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001). The current study uses discretionary accruals to 
test for different market reactions between firms. 
Data collection 
Annual 1 OK filing dates are available in Edgar starting in 1 993. Financial 
information to calculate the abnormal accruals using the cash flow version of the 
Modified Jones Model is collected fiom Compustat. Financial firms and public utilities 
are removed from the sample. The unique financial reporting of the financial firms make 
them unsuitable for testing when combined with other industries (Becker et al. 1998). 
Public utility firms are removed because they have motivations that differ from other 
commercial firms due to the regulatory environment in which they operate. Foreign 
domiciled companies are also removed from the sample because foreign firms do not 
have the same GAAP requirements as do US domiciled firms. Foreign firms traded in 
the US must reconcile net income and retained earnings to US GAAP or they can restate 
the financial statements to comply with US GAAP. Compustat does not reveal which of 
these options these firms choose, and variations in GAAP could affect the results. The 
companies selected for the data sample are limited to firms with over $75 million in total 
assets. Smaller firms have been found to have greater variability in the timeliness of firm 
filings. Most firms that filed after the SEC mandated due date were small and financially 
troubled (Alford et al. 1994). The $75 million number is chosen because the new SEC 
regulation of 10K and 10Q filings, when hlly implemented, is limited to firms with over 
$75 million in assets. 
To determine the company traditional filing period five years of filing data in 
EDGAR matched with corresponding Compustat data is required. To eliminate 
differences caused by companies using 52-53 week years, actual fiscal year ending dates 
are used. The fiscal year-end dates are obtained from Compact Disclosure when 
available. The remaining year-end dates are obtained fiom Edgar. The resulting sample 
is 23,846 firm year observations. 
Market reaction data for the event studies are obtained fiom the CRSP database. 
The annual earnings announcement dates are taken from the Compustat database. This 
period is used to eliminate the market reaction to the earnings announcement date from 
the beta calculation (Balsam et a1 2002). Following Balsam et a1 (2002) the data is 
Eurther restricted by requiring that the annual report filing date be at least 12 days 
subsequent to the earnings announcement date to eliminate cross contamination of events 
(Balsam et a1 2002). 
CHAPTER IV 
PRESENTATION OF ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
This chapter describes the data and presents the results of the hypothesis testing. 
The first section presents descriptive statistics of the sample data used followed by the 
empirical results. 
Data Description and Discussion 
Hypothesis One and Two 
Hypothesis one and two test for a relationship between time to file annual reports 
and earnings management calculated as abnormal accruals. The data for Hypotheses 1 
and 2 came from Compustat, SEC's EDGAR website, and Compact Disclosure. The 
annual report filing dates were collected from the SEC's EDGAR website. A total of . 
108,037 1 OK filing dates were collected from the EDGAR filed between 1994 and 2004. 
Financial data for a total of 104'3 17 firm years was collected from Cornpustat after 
eliminating financial firms, public utilities, and foreign firms. The days to file the annual 
report is calculated in the study as the number of days between the fiscal year end and the 
filing date. The fiscal year data included in Compustat does not include 52-53 week year 
ends. Company fiscal year end data was collected from Compact Disclosure where 
available and the missing year ends were collected from EDGAR. Combining financial 
data from Cornpustat with the annual report filing dates from EDGAR produced a 
potential sample size of 52,109 firm years with a minimum of three firm years of 
observations. However, restricting the sample to firms with a minimum of five firm year 
observations further reduced the size to 48,786. Additionally, limiting the firm size to a 
minimum of $75 million in total assets eliminated an additional 20,753 firm year 
observations. 
The number of days to file (DAYSTOFILE) was calculated for each firm year as 
the number of days between the company fiscal yearend and the date the annual report 
was filed with EDGAR. Detail summary statistics for this sample indicated a non-normal 
distribution of the DAYSTOFILE variable. The sample skewness was 5.27 and kurtosis 
was 54.91. DAYSTOFILE had a minimum of 14 days and a maximum of 943 days. 
Removing outliers, firms filing their annual report within 20 days of earnings 
announcement and firms filing their annual report more than 175 days after the earnings 
announcement reduced the skewness to .43 and the kurtosis to 8.73. This reduced the 
sample size to 23,846 firm year observations. A univariate t test of the DAYSTOFILE 
variable produced a t statistic of 932.72 with a P value of 0.000. 
Observations where operating cash flows, discretionary accruals, and other 
variables were more than three standard deviations from the sample means were 
eliminated as outliers following Subramanyam (1996). This resulted in a final sample 
size of 18,552 firm years representing 7,934 different firms. Table 1 describes the 
sample selection process. 
Table 2 provides sample distribution information by industry and year. SIC codes 
6000-6999 are financial firms and are eliminated due to the difficulty in estimating the 
discretionary accruals for these firms. The number of observations for SIC codes 4000- 
4999 is low due to the elimination of public utility firms which are also eliminated due to 
estimation difficulties. A total of 58 two digit SIC codes are represented in the sample. 
The number of observations by year increases after 1996 due to the SEC full 
implementation of required use of EDGAR for filing years 1997 and later. The limited 
number of observations for the year 2004 is due to the timing of the sample collection. 
The Compustat data was collected from the June 2004 disk. Only a limited number of 
firms had reported 2004 year end data at the time the CD was released. 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3. As expected, a large dispersion is 
present in the total assets variable with a skewness and kurtosis of 6.92 and 87.27 
respectively. The log of assets (LNTA) is used as the size proxy to reduce this 
dispersion. The use of the log of assets variable reduces the skewness and kurtosis to .69 
and 2.91 respectively. 
The discretionary accruals variable (DACC) has a mean of 0.001 and a standard 
deviation of 0.105. The discretionary accruals average less than one percent of total 
assets in this sample, and are not widely dispersed. A univariate t test of the DACC 
variable produced a t statistic of -.003 with a P value of 0.000. A t test of the mean of 
DACC for firms filed timely vs. the mean of DACC for firms filing late (using the 
companies mean definition of filing late) produced a t test value of 43.078 1 with a P 
value of 0.000. 
One assumption of linear regression models is that there is no linear relationship 
between the independent variables. A linear relationship between two independent 
variables (multicollinearity) can result in inefficient estimators in the regressions. Table 
4 presents correlation matrixes for the variables used in the models for testing 
Hypotheses 1 and 2. The results indicate an inverse relationshp between the low distress 
and the high distress dummy variables. This is expected as a firm in high distress should 
not be represented in the low distress variable. The other relationship indicated in Table 
4 is between the log of assets and the log of cash flow. The log of assets variable is the 
proxy for firm size. The cash flow variable is also affected by company size and the 
relationship is probably a result of firm size 
Hypothesis Three and Four 
The data for Hypothesis 3 and 4 use the dataset described above and then adds 
market data obtained from CRSP. The final sample of 18,552 firm year observations 
used in Hypotheses 1 and 2 was matched to data available from the CRSP database. This 
removed 4,70 1 firm year observations fiom the database. Limiting the observations to 
companies with December year-ends removed a further 4,758 observations from the 
database. Year 2003 data was also dropped because CRSP data was not available (2,225 
observations). A further 626 observations were removed as outliers. Observations where 
cash flow, discretionary accruals and price to book ratio that were greater than three 
standard deviations from the mean were dropped as outliers. These restrictions reduced 
the dataset available for Hypotheses 3 and 4 to 6,242 firm year observations. Table 5 
provides sample distribution statistics for the market reaction data. 
The calculation of the cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) resulted in a mean 
value of 1.2556 and a standard deviation of .0980 for CAR. A univariate t test of the 
CAR'S was performed testing the mean of CAR for firms with discretionary accruals 
greater than the mean vs. the mean of CAR for firms filing with discretionary accruals 
less than the mean. This test produced a t value of 4.9633 with a P value of 0.000. 
Empirical Results 
It is theorized that time to file annual reports has an effect on discretionary 
accruals. It is also theorized discretionary accruals have an effect on time to file annual 
reports. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is tested using simultaneous equations of models 2 and 
3. 
Hypothesis One Results 
Hypothesis 1 states that firms filing later than average will have income 
increasing discretionary accruals. Fili-ng later than average, the time variable of interest 
in the simultaneous equations, is measured in the nine different methods as stated earlier. 
A simultaneous equations model was used to test for the various definitions of the 
timeliness of annual report filing. The discretionary accruals used in these results were 
residuals calculated by model 1. The absolute value testing provides information 
regarding the magnitude of discretionary accruals in relation to the time of annual report 
filing. However, the hypothesis states that income increasing discretionary accruals will 
be present in later filing firms. The absolute value of discretionary accruals will indicate 
the magnitude but not the direction of the discretionary accruals. The signed value of the 
discretionary accruals will be used to test hypothesis one. 
The Hausman (1 978) specification test for endogeneity indicates that the number 
of days to file annual reports and discretionary accruals are endogenous ( X 2  statistic = 
1178.98 significant at the .000 level). Further, the Durbin Wu Hausman test finds a 
simultaneity bias between the two models (models 2 and 3) used to test hypothesis one (F 
value = 1542.13 significant at the .000 level). This indicates that days to file and 
discretionary accruals are jointly determined and requires the use of simultaneous 
equations estimation to provide consistent and unbiased estimators. 
Table 6 provides variable definitions used in the remaining tables. 
Hypothesis I theorizes that a relationship exists between earnings management 
and the time to file annual reports. An initial analysis of the relationship was conducted 
using simultaneous equations for models 2 and 3. The number of days between the 
company year end and the annual report filing date with EDGAR was used for this initial 
testing. The results of this initial testing are presented in Table 7. The table presents the 
results of testing the absolute value of discretionary accruals, a measure of the magnitude 
of earnings management, and the signed value of discretionary accruals, a measure of the 
direction of earnings management. The results of this testing indicate a positive 
relationship exists between the company filing date and the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals significant at the .O1 level with a t value of 7.17 for the days to file 
variable and 6.6378 for DACC (discretionary accruals). The positive relationship means 
that more earnings management is occurring with later filings, as predicted. The signed 
values of discretionary accruals have a negative relationship between the time variable 
(TIME) and discretionary accruals (DACC) significant at the .O1  level with a t value of 
8.75 for TIME and is not significant for DACC. This indicates that the earnings 
management that is occurring later is income decreasing in direction contrary to 
prediction in hypothesis one. 
The r2 goodness of fit used in ordinary least squares regressions (OLS) has no 
statistical meaning in the context of two staged least squares regressions. The model 
does provide a F statistic of 80.27 and a corresponding P value of 0.000 indicating the 
model is significant in explaining some of the variation present in the variables. Using 
OLS regressions for the individual component equations produced an adjusted r2 of 
0.1490 for a model using discretionary accruals as the dependent variable (model 2). An 
OLS regression of model 3, using TIME as the dependent variable, produced an adjusted 
I'2 of 0.0905. 
The analytic testing of late filers for Hypothesis 1 is presented in Tables 8 to 
Table 16. Hypothesis 1 states that companies filing late have income increasing earnings 
management present. Filing late is defined for this research in nine different methods. 
The tables present the results of the following tests: 
1 : Later than company mean 
2: Later than company median 
3: Later than industry mean 
4: Later than industry median 
5: Later then the sample mean 
6: Later then the sample median 
7: 5 days later than prior year 
8: 5 days later than industry mean 
9: 5 days later than industry median 
The results present consistent relationships in magnitude and direction of the 
discretionary accruals. For all tests, firms filing later than average have income 
decreasing abnormal accruals but at a greater magnitude (greater manipulation). Time is 
required to manipulate earnings as hypothesized. The results further indicate that 
decreasing earnings management is associated with later filings contradictory to the 
hypothesis. 
In six of nine cases the signed value of DACC is not significantly related to the 
TIME variable. However, the TIME variable is consistently negatively associated with 
the signed values of DACC. 
The results using the absolute value of DACC indicate a consistent, significant, 
and positive relationship between DACC and TIME. 
The coefficient of the DACC variable indicates that firms are not manipulating 
earnings to a great degree. For example, the coefficient for filing later than the company 
median is 765.4044 (table 9). This indicates that in order for a firm to change the 
discretionary accruals by 1% of total assets a firm would need to file the annual report 
765 days (over 2 years) later than the company median. The median for TIME is 1.54 
indicating that the average firm files only 1.5 days later than the company median. This 
1.5 days is probably explained by weekend differences. 
In contrast to the hypothesized results, the direction of the discretionary accruals 
is negative for firms filing later than average for firms filing later than the various 
measures of company average. 
These results indicate that firms filing later than average are decreasing abnormal 
accruals. A possible explanation of these results is that firms know how they are going to 
manipulate the results and minor manipulation occurs consistently over time. This is 
supported by the positive relationship between the absolute value of DACC and filing 
late. However, the occurrences where large manipulations appear, the manipulation is in 
the negative. This would be consistent with the big bath theory of cleaning the books 
when the increases are no longer possible. 
LEVERAGE is significant in all measures of late. For all occurrences the 
coefficient is negative for the absolute value of DACC and positive for the signed value 
of DACC. A positive relationship was predicted. The positive relationship present in the 
signed values of DACC indicate that more highly levered firms have income increasing 
abnormal accruals, as predicted. The negative relationship between the absolute value of 
DACC and LEVERAGE indicates that the higher levered firms have lower magnitudes of 
discretionary accruals. 
The high distress variable (HIDIS) is consistent in all tests where the high distress 
is significant. A positive relationship between high distressed firms and higher levels of 
abnormal accruals as theorized in the literature. Consistent with this, the signed values of 
DACC have a positive relationship and indicate that highly distress firms are increasing 
income through the use of discretionary accruals. However, the absolute value of DACC 
variable has a negative relationship indicating that the manipulation that is being used by 
these firms is small in quantity. 
The low distress variable (LODIS) has a negative coefficient in all tests. This 
negative coefficient for the low distress variable (LODIS) is negative as predicted 
indicating lower levels of earnings management for stronger firms. 
The sign of the coefficient of the cash flow variable (LNCASH) is consistent 
when significance. No prediction is made in the literature regarding the sign of the cash 
flow variable. For the signed values of DACC the LNCASH variable has a negative 
coefficient indicating income decreasing discretionary accruals associated with higher 
cash flows. In the absolute value DACC regression, the LNCASH coefficient has a 
positive sign indicating greater magnitude of discretionary accruals associated with 
higher cash flow. 
The size control variable log of total assets (LNTA) is significant in most cases. 
The coefficient is negative as expected in all the significant cases indicating that smaller 
firms have higher discretionary accrual percentages as predicted. 
The growth firm proxy variable, the price to book ratio is significant in only two 
cases; filing later than company mean and filing later than company median. The 
positive coefficient indicates that lower growth firms, firms with a higher price to book 
ratio, have lower discretionary accruals. No prediction was made with respect to this 
variable. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
There is concern that one year, or group of years could provide significantly 
different results. Year dummy variables were created in the dataset. Table 17 provides 
the results of the analysis including year dummy variables. In this analysis days to file 
was used as the time variable of interest and a late variable was not included. The results 
of this testing, are consistent with the results of the prior testing of the late filers 
presented above. For the signed vales of discretionary accruals, the sign of the 
coefficient of days to file is negative indicating a income decreasing discretionary 
accruals are associated with later filings. The coefficient of the absolute value of the 
discretionary accruals variable has a positive sign indicating later filers have greater 
magnitude of discretionary accruals. 
The year 2001 brought corporate scandals and greater regulatory scrutiny to 
financial reporting. Indicated in the year results is a significant difference between years 
in the years subsequent to 2000. The results presented in the earlier tables could be a 
result of only the most recent years. To test for this change a dummy variable was 
created for fiscal years subsequent to 2000. The results of this testing are included in 
Table 18. While a significant relationship exists (t values of 5.52 for pre 2000 filers and 
6.37 for post 2000 filers for the discretionary accruals variable), the affect of time to file 
on discretionary accruals is significant (t values of 7.39 and 9.07 for the time to file 
variable for pre 2000 and post 2000 filers respectively) and consistent with the prior 
findings. 
The coeflicient of the TIME variable is smaller for post 2000 and the DACC 
coefficient is larger for post 2000. Contrary to expectations, these results indicate greater 
manipulation subsequent to 2000. A possible explanation for these results could be that 
the post 2000 period was also a recessionary period and companies had more incentive to 
manipulate earnings during this period. Further the testing presented in the prior tables 
indicated that the later filers presented evidence of income decreasing earnings 
management. There results are consistent with the big bath theory and could indicate 
balance sheet cleaning. 
Hypothesis One Summary 
The findings provide support for the hypothesis that there is a relationship 
between discretionary accruals and time to file annual reports. The results suggest that 
firms filing later than average are manipulating earnings downward. The results would 
suggest that firms manipulate earnings on a consistent ongoing basis. Deviations from 
this appear to be income decreasing in nature. Therefore, Hypothesis 1, companies filing 
later than average have income increasing earnings management present, is not 
supported. While a relationship exists between discretionary accruals and time to file 
annual reports, the relationship is contrary to the hypothesis. 
Hypothesis Two Results 
Hypothesis 2 states that firms filing later than the SEC mandated 90 day filing 
period would have income decreasing earnings management present. The testing for this 
hypothesis was performed by creating a dummy variable for late filers, firms filing later 
than 93 days. The 93 day number is used to control for weekend variations. This dummy 
variable was then used as the dependent variable in a logit model that includes 
discretionary accruals and delay control variables as dependent variables. 
Table 19 presents the results of testing Hypothesis 2. Both the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals and the direction of discretionary accruals are significant in 
determining companies filing after the statutory period. The t values are 5.05 and 3.72 
for the unsigned and the signed values of discretionary accruals respectively. The control 
variables used in the model are all significant at the -0 1 level except the variable for non 
clean audit opinion which was dropped (The opinion variable was 100% associated with 
late filing). Support is found for Hypothesis 2 that firms filing subsequent to the statutory 
filing period (90 days) have income decreasing discretionary accruals. 
Hypothesis Three Results 
Hypothesis 3 states that the market recognizes and reacts negatively to income 
increasing abnormal accruals present in the annual report filings. To test this hypothesis 
the cumulative abnormal returns were calculated for each firm year for a 17 day event 
window surrounding the annual report filing date using model 6. The cumulative 
abnormal return was then regressed on the discretionary accruals variable. The results of 
the testing of Hypothesis 3 are presented in Table 20. Four separate tests were conducted 
for market reaction. Two tests were run for discretionary accruals, and two tests were run 
for the absolute value of discretionary accruals. A significant t value for the discretionary 
accruals variable would indicate that the market is reacting to the presence of 
discretionary accruals. Using the methodology of Balsam et al. (2002) unexpected 
discretionary accruals are calculated and the cumulative abnormal return regressed upon 
this unexpected accruals variable. The second set of tests was run using unexpected 
discretionary accruals, and absolute value of unexpected discretionary accruals. 
The four tests for Hypothesis 3 failed to produce significant results indicating a 
market reaction to discretionary accruals. The test for market reaction to discretionary 
accruals produced a t value of .52 for both the absolute value and the signed values of 
discretionary accruals respectively. The tests using the unexpected discretionary accruals 
variables produce t values of .66 and .67 for the signed and unsigned discretionary 
accruals variables respectively. 
Sloan (1996) and Xie (200 1) found no reaction to accruals in market tests. 
Balsam et al. (2002) found a market reaction to unexpected abnormal accruals in a 
market reaction test around quarterly filing dates. The Balsam et al. study used very 
restrictive constraints in their data selection process. These restrictions resulted in a 
sample size of 613 firm quarters. In their sensitivity analysis Balsam et al. state that they 
could not eliminate the possibility that their results were from sample selection bias. The 
current research extended the Balsam et al. study by using a larger data set that included 
firms suspected of earnings management and firms not suspected of earnings 
management. 
One of the selection criteria used in the Balsam et al. study was firms that meet 
analyst forecast or exceeded the analyst forecast by one cent. Prior research has found 
that the market reacts to firm results that vary fiom analyst forecasts. Analyst forecast 
data is unavailable to use in the current study. A proxy for unexpected earnings was used 
in this testing. If analyst forecast dispersion and/or firm reported income variance fiom 
analyst forecast was used as a control variable, significant results could be found for this 
hypothesis. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
The testing for Hypothesis 3 failed to produce significant in one of the two tests 
for indicating a market reaction to discretionary accruals. Additional testing was 
performed to confirm the results. Balsam et al. (2002) used unexpected abnormal 
accruals (change in abnormal accruals from the prior period). Unexpected accruals were 
included in the testing of the current research. There is the possibility that the market 
only recognizes extreme changes in accruals and this is what Balsam et a1 found. The 
sample used in the current study includes firms not suspected of managing earnings. An 
additional test was performed using extremes in abnormal accruals. Extreme abnormal 
accruals were selected as the top and bottom decile of abnormal accruals. The results 
(Table 22) of this test were the same, no market reaction (recognition). 
At the time of the earnings announcement the information needed to observe the 
presence of earnings management is not available. If the market reacted significantly to 
the earnings announcement and then found the announcement included managed 
earnings, there could be a negative market reaction to the annual filing. The cumulative 
abnormal return was calculated for the earnings announcement period (day -1 to day +2). 
The results were used in several different tests of the cumulative abnormal return around 
the filing date. The first test was to control for the announcement reaction. As expected 
a significant relationship exists between the returns for the announcement period and the 
returns for the filing period. However, no relationship exists between the filing date 
cumulative abnormal return and the discretionary accruals when controlling for the 
announcement period abnormal returns. 
The market reaction to earnings announcements has been documented to begin 
several days before the actual announcement; the market reacts in anticipation. The betas 
for the testing of hypothesis three were calculated using - 18 1 to - 1 days prior to the 
earnings announcement date. A additional test was performed using - 18 1 to - 10 days 
prior to the earnings announcement date to eliminate the market reaction to the earnings 
announcement from the beta calculation. The results of this testing are presented in table 
21. The results indicate that the market doses not recognize discretionary accruals, 
column 1 and 2 of the table. However, the market does react to unexpected discretionary 
accruals, the difference between the discretionary accruals from the prior year and the 
discretionary accruals in the current year. Column three of table 2 1 presents the results of 
testing the absolute value of the change in discretionary accruals. The results are 
significant at the .O1 level with a t statistic of 2.59. The positive sign of the coefficient 
indicates that the market is reacting positively to an increase in discretionary accruals. 
Column four of the table presents the results of testing the signed values of discretionary 
accruals. The negative coefficient of the discretionary accruals variable indicates that the 
market reacts negatively to income increasing discretionary accruals. The t statistic 
(2.37) is significant at the -05 level. 
The Balsam et al. (2002) results appear to be a result of sample selection and not a 
market reaction as concluded in their paper. This would contribute to the lack of 
significant results for this hypothesis. Balsam et al. selected firms that met analyst 
forecast or exceeded the forecast by one cent. The market reaction documented in their 
study could be a market reaction to the results instead of the suspected earnings 
management. 
Hypothesis Four Results 
Hypothesis 4 is testing for market reaction to abnormal accruals in companies that 
file their annual reports subsequent to the statutory 90 filing period. Of the 6,242 firm 
years included in the market reaction data set, 88 of these firms filed their annual reports 
subsequent to the 90 day period. This dataset of 88 firm years is used for testing 
Hypothesis 4. The testing of Hypothesis 4 was performed in the same manner as 
Hypothesis 3. The cumulative abnormal returns were calculated for each firm year for 
the 17 day event window. These returns were then regressed on the discretionary 
accruals to test for a market reaction (market recognition). The results of the testing for 
market reaction are presented in Table 23. The testing produced insignificant results (t 
values of 1.34 and 1.30 for discretionary accruals) which indicate the market does not 
react to abnormal accruals (earnings management) present in filers subsequent to the 90 
day period. This finding is consistent with the finding of Hypothesis 3 that found no 
market reaction to abnormal accruals. The market reaction was tested for absolute value 
of abnormal accruals (magnitude), signed values of abnormal accruals (direction). 
The unexpected abnormal accruals used by Balsam et al. (2002) were also tested 
for Hypothesis 4. Consistent with Hypothesis 3 and the findings from discretionary 
accruals above no significant reaction was indicated (t values of 1.05 and 1.09 for 
unsigned and signed discretionary accruals respectively). 
The hypothesis also predicted that the sign of the abnormal accruals would be 
income decreasing. The companies would be removing the earnings management 
consistent with the big bath theory. Consistent with the results of Hypothesis 2, the 
abnormal accruals for all 88 of the late filers had a negative direction indicating income 
decreasing earnings management. This provides support for the theory that companies 
filing later than the statutory period are going to "clean" the books and remove earnings 
manipulation to use in subsequent years. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter summarizes the study, the conclusions are discussed, identifies 
limitations of the study, and suggests future research. 
Summary 
The SEC has reduced the time for companies to file their annual and quarterly 
financial reports. The announcement of this change in The Wall Street Journal states that 
this is a response to the accounting scandals of Enron and other companies. The ofticia1 
SEC release states that providing information to the stakeholders sooner would be 
beneficial. Prior accounting literature theorizes that earnings management requires time 
to physically move earnings from one period to another. If the theory is true then the 
SEC reduction of time to file should reduce company ability to manage earnings. If the 
market recognizes earnings management then providing the information to the 
stakeholders sooner would be beneficial for stakeholders to adjust their portfolios based 
upon the new information. 
This study tests the theory that earnings management requires time by examining 
abnormal accruals in relation to the quantity of time between company year ends and the 
statutory annual report filing. More specifically, the study examines abnormal accruals 
present in firms that file later than company average. Prior accounting literature finds 
that companies file at traditional filing dates. Deviations from these traditional filing 
dates indicate time series shocks. If companies are manipulating earnings inconsistently 
and time is required to move earnings from one period to another, then abnormal accruals 
(earnings management) should be present in firm years filed later than company average. 
The SEC announcement stated that reducing the filing time would provide 
information to stakeholders sooner. If the market recognizes earnings management then 
providing the information to the stakeholders sooner would be beneficial. The prior 
accounting literature is inconsistent in the conclusion regarding the market recognition of 
earnings management. Studies such as Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001) found the market 
does not recognize the accruals portion of earnings. Balsam et al. (2002) found that the 
market does recognize earnings management. The present study uses the methodology of 
the Balsam et al. study and the larger sample sizes of Sloan and Xie to mitigate this 
inconsistency. 
Simultaneous equations are used to answer the question of the effect of timeliness 
of report filing on abnormal accruals. The Hausman specification test finds that there is 
endogeneity between the timeliness of filing and abnormal accruals. Prior studies in this 
area have ignored the endogeneity and as a result, have presented biased results. 
- This study draws upon prior accounting research to develop four research 
hypotheses. It is hypothesized that there is a relationship between abnormal accruals and 
the time companies file their annual reports. It is hypothesized that there is abnormal 
accruals present in annual report filings filed after the statutory 90 day filing period. It is 
hypothesized that the market does recognize earnings management in company annual 
report filings. Finally, it is hypothesized that the market recognizes earnings 
management present in companies filing after the statutory 90 day filing period. 
To test these hypotheses a sample size of 18,552 firm years for Hypotheses 1 and 
2 and a sample size of 6,242 firm years for Hypotheses 3 and 4 was collected. To test 
Hypothesis 1 two models were developed from the prior literature. The first model 
included variables found to affect the abnormal accruals and the second model included 
variables found to affect the timeliness of report filing. These two models were then used 
to test the simultaneous equations model for ~ ~ ~ o t h e s i s  1. Hypothesis 2 was tested using 
a logit model to test for significance relationship between discretionary accruals and 
firms that file after the statutory 90 day filing period. The model used to test Hypotheses 
3 and 4 was developed by Balsam et al. (2002). 
Conclusions 
Hypothesis one states that firms that file 10K reports later than the normal 
company traditional filing date have income increasing earnings management present. 
This study fails to find support for Hypothesis 1 as written. However, a relationship is 
found to exist between time to file annual reports and earnings management but not in the 
direction hypothesized. Support is found for Hypothesis 2, a relationship exists between 
earnings management and firms filing annual reports subsequent to the 90 day statutory 
filing date. Hypotheses 3 and 4 theorize that the market recognizes earnings 
management. Partial support was found for Hypotheses 3. And no support was found for 
Hypothesis 4. 
The result of Hypothesis 1 testing presents evidence supporting the theory that 
physically moving earnings from one period to another requires time. In testing the 
simultaneous equations model for all firms regardless of filing late or on time, the model 
finds support for the theory. However, support is not found for the theory that income 
increasing discretionary accruals are associated with firms filing later than average. 
Support was found for Hypothesis 2, that there would be earnings management 
present in companies filing subsequent to the statutory 90 day filing period. The logit 
model found a significant difference between the two groups providing support for the 
hypothesis. The theory is that companies filing subsequent to .the statutory filing period 
are going to be punished by the market providing less motivation for the manipulation of 
earnings. With less motivation to move earnings upward, there should be income 
decreasing abnormal accruals present in these firm years. The test of the model using the 
signed values of DACC found income decreasing accruals present in the late filers 
consistent with the big bath theory. 
Hypothesis 3 states that the market recognizes earnings management. The models 
used for testing this hypothesis were developed by Balsam et al. (2002). In the Balsam et 
al. study the authors found the market does react negatively to earnings management. 
However, they used numerous restrictions and were unable to present evidence that the 
conclusion was not the results of the sample selection. By restricting the calculation of 
the betas to ending 10 days prior to the earnings announcement date a market reaction 
was found to unexpected discretionary accruals. 
The accounting literature documents lower market reaction to later filings. The 
relationship found in the testing of Hypothesis 1 between earnings management and the 
timeliness of reporting would support the lack of market reaction to earnings 
management. Firms that are engaging in earnings management are filing reports later 
than other firms. The market reaction to the later filing is reduced, therefore, a reaction, 
if any, to earnings management may not be detectable. 
No support was found for Hypothesis 4 regarding market reaction to earnings 
management in companies filing subsequent to the statutory filing period. All but 2 firm 
years included in this subsample possessed income decreasing abnormal accruals. While 
there was income decreasing abnormal accruals present in this group, the market failed to 
recognize and adjust the market price for the presence of earnings management. 
The overall conclusion to be generated from this study is that time is required to 
physically move earnings from one time period to another. This is important because it 
provides support for the SEC's move to reduce the time to file annual and quarterly 
reports by suggesting that this reduction of statutory filing time helps reduce earnings 
management. The study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that the steps 
being taken by the SEC can help reduce future earnings management. 
The study further contributes to the literature by helping to resolve some of the 
inconsistent research results regarding the market recognition of earnings management. 
The prior literature on market recognition of earnings management presents two diverse 
conclusions regarding the subject. The results of this study help provide support that the 
market does recognize changes in discretionary accruals fiom the prior year. The market 
does not recognize discretionary accruals that are higher than industry averages. 
Limitations 
The tests and conclusions presented in this study should be viewed in context. 
While this study used as many industries as possible, utilities and financial institutions 
were omitted because of the difference in the nature of their financial specifics. The 
conclusions of this study cannot be extended to those industries. This study covers a 
specific period of time. Financial standards and ethics change over time, the results of 
this study should apply to years beyond the years included in the study but caution must 
be used to generalize these results to other years. 
The current study may have ignored other variables that could explain some of the 
variation in the dependent variables. The study attempts to mitigate some of the potential 
omitted variable bias by using a cross-sectional panel study design. This does not 
guarantee that all possible omitted variables have been controlled for in this manner. 
Limitations on data chosen for the study could have eliminated the possibility of 
other conclusions. Another set of data with a different set of restrictions could find 
different conclusions using the same model. 
The market reaction data is limited to firms with annual earnings announcement 
dates available. This restriction is placed upon the data in order to have the 
corresponding annual report filing date. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
This study used only annual report filings. The study needs to be extended to 
include quarterly filings. The timeliness of quarterly reports could show different results. 
The market reaction results of Balsam et al. used quarterly reports. It is possible that 
using quarterly data, a market reaction to earnings management could be detected instead 
of only a reaction to changes in discretionary accruals from the prior period. 
The present study found that the market does not recognize earnings management 
only changes from prior years. Future research needs to be performed to understand why 
the market does not recognize and react to earnings management. This research could 
lead to increase disclosure requirements to improve the transparency of financial results. 
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Tables 
TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
* The calculation of abnormal accruals uses a beginning lag year of total assets, 3,626 firms years 
did not have a prior lag year of data available. 
Market 
Reaction 
Sample 
(fm years) 
18,552 
-626 
-4,70 1 
-2,225 
-4,758 
6,242 
Initial dataset 
Removed for less than 5 fm year observations 
Removed for total assets <$75 million 
Removed for days to file > 175 
Removed for days to file < 20 
Lost for initial year* 
Lost for missing data points 
Removed for outliers 
Data available in CRSP 
Year 2003 observations 
Limited to December year ends 
Final sample size for H1 and H2 
Timeliness 
Sample 
(fum years) 
52,109 
-3,323 
-20,753 
-542 
-19 
-3,626 
-3,47 1 
-1,823 
18,552 
TABLE 2 
Distribution of Days to File 
I SIC I 
Codes* 
20-29 
3 0-3 9 
50-59 
70-79 
80-89 
90-99 
Observations 
1,162 
3,561 
6,011 
1,494 
3,090 
2,402 
18,552 
Minimum 
File Days 
3 3 
22 
23 
2 1 
24 
24 
3 3 
36 
* SIC codes 6000-6999 are financial firms and were eliminated ffom the sample. 
Minimum 
File Days 
33 
26 
3 5 
23 
22 
25 
26 
24 
25 
22 
2 1 
Maximum 
File Days 
170 
174 
169 
173 
175 
166 
167 
143 
Percentage 
of Total 
Sample 
6.3% 
19.2% 
32.4% 
8.1% 
16.7% 
12.9% 
4.0% 
0.5% 
Maximum 
File Days 
165 
163 
166 
- 170 
170 
166 
173 
175 
174 
167 
117 
Percentage 
of Total 
Sample 
5.0% 
4.9% 
6.7% 
10.5% 
12.2% 
12.8% 
12.4% 
12.1% 
1 1.5% 
10.8% 
1.2% 
TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables in the Analysis 
The sample size is 18,552 fm years representing 7,934 separate f m s .  
Sales 
Assets 
Log of Assets 
Net Income 
Negative Net Income 
Cash Flow (Operations) 
Log of Cash Flow 
LEVERAGE 
Days to File 
Discretionary accruals 
ABS DAC 
2-score 
Price to Book Ratio 
Extraordinary Items 
Extra 
Low Distress 
High Distress 
Auditor Change 
Busy 
Opinion 
Units 
$ Millions 
$ Millions 
% Millions 
$ Millions 
Percent 
Days 
Percent 
$ Millions 
Minimum 
10.20 
75.02 
4.32 
-1 1,826.00 
0.00 
- 1,4 13.30 
-3.91 
0.00 
2 1-00 
-.924 
0.00 
-36.94 
-77.2 1
-16,778.52 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Maximum 
69,506.10 
113,105.00 
1 1.64 
6,296.80 
1 .OO 
3,900.00 
8.27 
3.74 
174.00 
.953 
.953 
311.41 
90.27 
6,923.87 
1 .OO 
1 .OO 
1 .OO 
1 .OO 
1 .OO 
1 .OO 
Mean 
1,956.41 
1,953.99 
6.42 
6 1.92 
0.25 
170.45 
4.02 
0.27 
82.82 
.OO 1 
.067 
4.56 
2.72 
-4.17 
0.16 
0.56 
0.20 
0.10 
0.68 
0.00 
Median 
522.22 
495.96 
6.2 1 
16.16 
0.00 
38.20 
3.95 
0.24 
87.00 
.009 
.044 
3.22 
1.85 
0.00 
0.00 
1 .OO 
0.00 
0.00 
1 .OO 
0.00 
Std.Dev. 
4,472.67 
4,747.56 
1.38 
358.44 
0.43 
421.51 
1.64 
0.24 
12.09 
.lo5 
.080 
7.14 
5.37 
150.72 
0.37 
0.50 
0.40 
0.30 
0.46 
0.02 
TABLE 4 
Correlation Matrix 
DAYST PRICETO 
OFILE _leverage LODIS HIDIS LNCASH LNTA BOOK EXTRA AUDCHG BUSY OPIN NEGNI 
DAYSTOFILE 1 .OOOO 
LEVERAGE 0.1212 1.0000 
LODIS -0.0701 -0.553 1 1 .OOOO 
HIDIS 0.0929 0.4967 -0.5407 1.0000 
LNCASH -0.2724 -0.013 1 -0.0540 -0.0540 1 .OOOO 
LNTA -0.0247 0.1 160 -0.1233 0.0901 0.8498 1 .OOOO 
PRICETOBOOK -0.0656 -0.1290 0.2047 -0.1440 0.1649 0.1022 1 .OOOO 
EXTRA 0.0014 0.2045 -0.2025 0.1891 0.0937 0.1568 -0.0542 1 .OOOO 
AUDCHG 0.0524 0.0032 -0.0071 0.0127 -0.0492 -0.0558 -0.0220 0.0582 1 .OOOO 
BUSY -0.0510 0.0742 -0.11 12 0.1268 0.1 136 0.1294 0.0102 0.0472 -0.0297 1 .OOOO 
OPIN 0.01 18 0.0075 0.0013 -0.0085 -0.0069 -0.0002 -0.0056 0.0020 0.0058 -0.0189 1 .OOOO 
NEGNI 0.1394 0.2427 -0.2947 0.3680 -0.2223 -0.0836 -0.1247 0.0837 0.0083 0.0383 0.0279 1 .OOOO 
DAYSTOFILE 
LEVERAGE 
LODIS 
HIDIS 
LNCASH 
LNTA 
PRICETOBOOK 
EXTRA 
AUDCHG 
BUSY 
OPIN 
NEGNI 
Number of days between the fm year end and the 10-K filing on EDGAR 
Financial leverage of fm in the current year 
Low distress - z-score of above 3.0 
High distress - z-score of less than 1.8 1 
Log of cash flow fiom 
operations 
Log of total assets 
Price to book ratio 
Presence of an extraordinary item 
Change in auditor fiom prior year 
Busy season audit (Dec or Jan year end) 
Audit opinion other than clean 
Presence of a negative net income 
TABLE 5 
Distribution of Days to File for Sample Used in the Event Study 
* SIC codes 6000-6999 are financial firms and were eliminated from the sample. 
SIC 
Codes* 
10-19 
20-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
70-79 
80-89 
90-99 
Observations 
447 
1,325 
2,043 
610 
594 
928 
259 
3 6 
6,242 
Minimum 
File Days 
Year 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
200 1 
2002 
Minimum 
File Days 
39 
39 
38 
3 5 
32 
35 
3 1 
35 
3 6 
Observations 
267 
26 1 
358 
446 
78 1 
859 
979 
1,114 
1,177 
6,242 
Maximum 
File Days Percentage 
Maximum 
File Days 
165 
163 
166 
166 
- 166 
119 
158 
106 
158 
7.16% 
21.23% 
32.73% 
9.77% 
9.52% 
14.87% 
4.15% 
0.58% 
38 
36 
31 
3 5 
50 
3 3 
44 
6 1 
Percentage 
4.3% 
4.2% 
5.7% 
7.1% 
12.5% 
13.8% 
15.7% 
17.8% 
18.9% 
105 
I 166 
' 158 
106 
158 
116 
138 
92 
TABLE 6 
Variable Definitions 
DAYSTOFILE The number of days between the company fiscal year end and the annual report is filed on 
the SEC EDGAR website. 
DACC The discretionary accruals calculated as the residuals from the cash flow industry variant of 
the modified Jones model. 
ABSDACC The absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated as the residuab &om the cash flow 
variant of the modified Jones model. 
TIME The number of days the current year observation varies &om the average calculated by 
subtracting the company average 6om the days to file. 
LEVERAGE The company's financial leverage (total debt 1 total assets) at the current fiscal year end. 
LODIS Low distressed f m s .  A dummy variable with a value of one for firms with an Altman Z- 
score above 3.0 
HIDIS High distressed firms. A dummy variable with a value of one for firms with an Altrnan Z- 
score below 1.8 1. 
LNCASH The log of cash flow from operations. 
LNTA The log of total assets. The proxy variable for size. 
PRICETOBOOK The price to book ratio as a proxy for growth firms at the end of the current fiscal year. 
EXTRA A dummy variable with a value of one indicating the presence of an extraordinary item in 
the current year. 
AUDCHG A dummy variable with a value of one if the auditor for the current year is different from 
the prior year. 
BUSY Audits conducted during the "busy" season. A dummy variable with a value of one for 
firms with a December or January year end. 
OPIN A dummy variable with a value of one for f m s  with other than clean audit opinion for the 
current fiscal year end. 
NEGNI A dummy variable with a value of one for firms with a negative net income in the current 
year. 
TABLE 7 
Hypothesis One Initial Testing - Filing date and DACC 
Testing Days to File as the time variable of interest. Testing for a relationship between the DAYSTOFILE 
and DACC. 
DACC = a, + alTIME + a2LEVERAGE + a3LODISt + a4HIDISt + aSLNCASH + asLNTA + 
a7PRICETOBOOK+ E 
TIME = a. + alDACC + a2LNTA + a3EXTRA + a4AUDCHG + a5BUSY + a60PIN+ a7NEGNI + a8HIDISt 
+ E 
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respectfully. 
Variables defined in table 6. t statistics in parentheses. 
Endogenous Variables 
DAYSTOFILE 
D ACC 
Common Explanatory Variables 
LNTA 
HIDIS 
Absolute 
0.0003 
(7.17) *** 
-0.0057 
(7.45) *** 
0.025 1 
(14.31) *** 
Value of DACC 
6.6378 
(6.27) *** 
-2.0045 
(32.32) *** 
2.6047 
(11.80) *** 
Signed Value 
-.0005 
(8.75) *** 
-0.044 1 
(46.73) *** 
-0.0325 
(15.08) *** 
0.6650 
(2.89) *** 
2.0095 
(6.62) *** 
-0.746 1 
(4.07) *** 
5.83 15 
(1.52) 
2.4375 
(11.44) *** 
94.4 142 
(2 19.69) 
245.41 
0.000 
of DACC 
-0.5384 
(.64) 
-2.0495 
(33.23) *** 
2.6693 
(12.09) *** 
-0.0133 
(3.73) *** 
-0.0148 
(8.58) *** 
-0.0385 
(48.38) *** 
0.0001 
(2.93) *** 
-0.0949 
(13.91) 
393.11 
0.000 
Variables for Earnings Management 
LEVERAGE 
LODIS 
LNCASH 
PRICETOBOOK 
Variables for Time to File 
EXTRA 
AUDCHG 
BUSY 
OPIN 
NEGNI 
CONSTANT 
F test 
F test probability 
I 
0.6738 
(2.93) *** 
2.0209 
(6.65) *** 
-0.7478 
(4.08) *** 
5.8322 
(1.52) 
2.5897 
(11.67) *** 
95.0956 
(227.66) 
240.08 
0.000 
-0.0028 
(0.96) 
-0.005 1 
(3.65) *** 
0.0002 
(0.37) 
0.0001 
(5.10) *** 
0.0593 
(10.66) 
80.27 
0.000 
TABLE 8 
Hypothesis One Testing - Filing Late vs. Company Mean 
Testing TIME as the time variable of interest. TIME defined as the difference between the company mean 
days to file and the fm year observation days to file. 
DACC = a. + alTIME + a2LEVERAGE + a,LODISt + a4HIDISt + asLNCASH + a6LNTA + 
a7PRICETOBOOK+ E 
TIME = a. + alDACC + a2LNTA + a3EXTRA + a4AUDCHG + asBUSY + a60PIN+ a7NEGNI + 
asHIDISt + E 
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respecthlly. 
Variables defmed in table 6. t statistics in parentheses. 
Endogenous Variables 
TIME 
DACC 
Common Explanatory Variables 
LNTA 
HIDIS 
Variables for Earnings Management 
LEVERAGE 
LODIS 
LNCASH 
PRICETOBOOK 
Variables for Time to File 
EXTRA 
AUDCHG 
BUSY 
OPIN 
NEGNI 
CONSTANT 
F test 
F test probability - 
Absolute 
0.006 1 
(2.56) * 
-0.0206 
(2.12) * 
0.0109 
(0.29) 
0.0774 
(1.43) 
-0.0121 
(1 .OO) 
-.0068 
(0.84) 
0.0001 
(2.74) *** 
-0.1288 
(1 32) 
23.24 
0.000 
Vaiue of DACC 
3720.699 
(2.46) * 
-15.2872 
(2.09) * 
-30.6665 
(1.99) * 
3.7806 
(0.56) 
-7.1083 
(0.79) 
-0.7821 
(0.17) 
14.8639 
(0.17) 
-141.1867 
(2.44) ** 
-272.90 17 
(2.23) 
1.15 
.329 
Signed 
-0.006 1 
(2.41) ** 
-0.0181 
(1.86) * 
-0.0 185 
(0.49) 
-0.0942 
(1.69) * 
-0.03 19 
(2.68) *** 
-0.03 13 
(3.90) *** 
0.0001 
(2.02) **  
0.0765 
(1 .O 1) 
26.43 
0.000 
Value of DACC 
-72.3598 
(1.65) * 
-3.6691 
(6.15) *** 
-5.5692 
(1.05) 
2.976 1 
(0.93) 
1.1 170 
(0.39) 
8.3022 
(2.24) ** 
9.3044 
(1.11) 
-4.5627 
(1.05) 
29.7093 
(15.60) 
35.45 
0.000 
TABLE 9 
Hypothesis One Testing - Filing Late vs. Company Median 
Testing TIME as the time variable of interest. TIME defined as the difference between the company 
median days to file and the fm year observation days to file. 
DACC = a. + alTIME + a2LEVERAGE + a3LODISt + a4HIDISt + a5LNCASH + a6SIZE + 
a7PRICETOBOOK+ E 
TIME = a. + alDACC + azsize + a3EXTRA + a4AUDCHG + asBUSY + a60PM+ a7NEGNI + a,HIDISt + 
E 
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respecthlly. 
Variables defined in table 6. t statistics in parentheses. 
Endogenous Variables 
TIME 
DACC 
Common Explanatory Variables 
LNTA 
HIDIS 
Absolute Value of DACC 
0.0440 
(8.73) *** 
-0.0184 
(2.65) *** 
-0.0283 
(1.70) * 
0.1910 
(0.65) 
0.9530 
(2.45) *** 
0.2199 
(1.07) 
6.0422 
(0.94) 
0.2676 
(0.67) 
4.05 13 
(8.13) 
29.1 1 
0.000 
Signed Value 
-0.0675 
(9.08) *** 
0.0071 
(0.67) 
0.0496 
(1.96) * 
Variables for Earnings Management 
LEVERAGE 
LODIS 
LNCASH 
PRICETOBOOK 
Variables for Time to File 
EXTRA 
AUDCHG 
BUSY 
OPIN 
NEGNI 
CONSTANT 
F test 
F test probability 
765.4044 
(7.55) *** 
-3.3423 
(5.71) ** 
-3.5594 
(2.16) *** 
of DACC 
-24.1635 
(8.08) *** 
-0.5328 
(7.29) *** 
1.6756 
(5.26) *** 
-0.1703 
(4.82) *** 
-0.0147 
(1.31) *** 
.0074 
(1.35) 
0.0002 
(1.73) * 
-0.1085 
(3.2 1) 
1 1.35 
0.000 
0.2902 
(0.23) 
-0.7404 
(0.43) 
-1.5883 
(1.74) * 
6.9027 
(0.39) 
-26.97 17 
(6.61) *** 
-58.1729 
(6.96) 
7.82 
0.000 
0.2440 
I 
(4.56) *** 
0.000 1 
(0.00) 
-0.0495 
(5.92) *** 
-0.000 1 
(0.65) 
0.1640 
(3.2 1) 
14.54 
0.000 
TABLE 10 
Hypothesis One Testing - Filing Late vs. Industry Mean 
Testing TIME as the time variable of interest. TIME defined as the difference between the industry mean 
days to file and the firm year observation days to file. 
DACC = a,-, + alTIME + azLEVERAGE + a3LODISt + a,HIDISt + asLNCASH + a6LNTA + 
a7PRICETOBOOK+ E 
TIME = Q + alDACC + azsize + a3EXTRA + a4AUDCHG + asBUSY + a60PIN+ a7NEGNI + asHIDISt + 
E 
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respectfully. 
Variables defined in table 6. t statistics in parentheses. 
Endogenous Variables 
TIME 
DACC 
Common Explanatory Variables 
LNTA 
HIDIS 
Variables for Earnings Management 
LEVERAGE 
LODIS 
LNCASH 
PRICETOBOOK 
Variables for Time to File 
EXTRA 
AUDCHG 
BUSY 
opin 
NEGNI 
CONSTANT 
F test 
F test probability 
Absolute Value of DACC Signed 
-0.0626 
(4.86) *** 
-0.0070 
(0.40) 
0.1242 
(2.80) *** 
0.2965 
(3.29) *** 
0.0064 
(0.25) 
-0.0756 
(5.37) *** 
0.0001 
(0.70) 
0.5689 
(3.60) 
5.03 
0.000 
0.05 14 
(5.47) *** 
-0.0364 
(2.58) *** 
-0.1036 
(3.01) *** 
Value of DACC 
-4.0532 
(1 .O 1) 
- 1.2984 
(10.79) *** 
3.495 1 
(7.51) *** 
I 
1.0443 
(2.35) ** 
1.7970 
(2.98) *** 
-0.4246 
(1.20) 
7.1698 
(2.36) ** 
1.3725 
(2.38) ** 
12.7909 
(16.38) 
29.19 
0.000 
944.0594 
(7.52) *** 
-3.549 1 
(4.84) *** 
-2.76 18 
(1 -35) 
-0.2577 
(3.66) *** 
0.0120 
(0.56) 
0.0308 
(2.77) *** 
0.000 1 
(0.4 1) 
-0.493 1 
(4.16) 
4.56 
0.000 
1.3506 
(0.87) 
-0.2881 
(0.13) 
-2.8230 
(2.42) ** 
9.0171 
(0.37) 
-34.6293 
(6.83) *** 
-64.0335 
(6.16) 
9.24 
0.000 
TABLE 1 1 
Hypothesis One Testing - Filing Late vs. Industry Median 
Testing TIME as the time variable of interest. TIME defined as the difference between the industry median 
days to file and the fm year observation days to file. 
DACC = a. + alTIME + azLEVERAGE + a3LODESt + a4HIDISt + aSLNCASH + a6LNTA + 
a7PRICETOBOOK+ E 
TIME = a. + alDACC + a2size + a3EXTRA + a4AUDCHG + aSBUSY + a60PIN+ a7NEGNI + asHIDISt + 
E 
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respectfully. 
Variables defined in table 6. t statistics in parentheses. 
Endogenous Variables 
TIME 
DACC 
Common Explanatory Variables 
LNTA 
HIDIS 
Absolute 
0.0505 
(9.00) *** 
-0.0467 
(5.28) *** 
-0.0344 
(2.15) ** 
Value of DACC 
637.0776 
(8.12) *** 
-1.3519 
(2.93) *** 
- 1.7850 
(1.33) 
Signed Value 
-0.0727 
(8.84) *** 
-0.03 14 
(2.39) ** 
0.0533 
(2.30) ** 
Variables for Earnings Management 
LEVERAGE 
LODIS 
LNCASH 
PRICETOBOOK 
Variables for Time to File 
EXTRA 
AUDCHG 
BUSY 
OPIN 
NEGNI 
CONSTANT 
F test 
F test probability 
of DACC 
-0.5 194 
(0.22) 
- 1.9252 
(27.28) *** 
2.4200 
(8.90) *** 
-0.2913 
(7.03) *** 
0.0086 
(0.74) 
0.0529 
(6.40) *** 
0.0002 
(1.48) 
-0.1624 
(4.09) 
12.07 
0.000 
0.4032 
(1 SO) 
1.4555 
(4.29) *** 
-0.5696 
(2.86) *** 
4.6095 
(4.77) *** 
2.4028 
(7.02) *** 
7.5259 
(16.61) *** 
132.91 
0.000 
0.6257 
(0.60) 
0.0487 
(0.03) 
-2.2025 
(2.87) *** 
5.9237 
(0.39) 
-22.0991 
(6.95) *** 
-44.3240 
(6.84) 
17.49 
0.000 
0.4022 
(6.68) *** 
0.0098 
(0.59) 
-0.1143 
(9.69) *** 
-0.000 1 
(0.33) 
0.2227 
(3.79) 
14.75 
0.000 
TABLE 12 
Hypothesis One Testing - Filing Late vs. Sample Mean 
Testing TIME as the time variable of interest. TIME defined as the difference between the sample mean 
days to file and the fm year observation days to file. 
DACC = a,-, + alTIME + a2LEVERAGE + a3LODISt + a4HIDISt + aSLNCASH + a6LNTA + 
a,PRICETOBOOK+ E 
TIME = uo + alDACC + azsize + a3EXTRA + a4AUDCHG + asBUSY + a60PIN+ a7NEGNI + asHIDISt + 
E 
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respecl3%lly. 
Variables defmed in table 6. t statistics in parentheses. 
Endogenous Variables 
TIME 
DACC 
Common Explanatory Variables 
LNTA 
HIDIS 
Absolute Value of DACC 
0.0427 
(9.93) *** 
-0.0407 
(5.49) *** 
-0.03 1 1 
(2.28) ** 
Signed Value 
-0.0627 
(10.21) *** 
-0.024 1 
(2.19) ** 
0.0501 
(2.50) ** 
Variables for Earnings Management 
LEVERAGE 
LODIS 
LNCASH 
PRICETOBOOK 
Variables for Time to File 
EXTRA 
AUDCHG 
BUSY 
OPrN 
NEGNI 
CONSTANT 
F test 
F test probability 
670.9204 
(8.29) *** 
-1.3713 
(2.87) *** 
-1.9414 
(1.37) 
of DACC 
-3.6653 
(1.52) 
-2.0717 
(29.10) *** 
2.51 13 
(9.16) *** 
0.3864 
(7.56) *** 
-0.0335 
(2.33) ** 
-0.1 115 
(11.05) *** 
0.0000 
(0.25) 
0.4279 
(6.41) 
19.58 
0.000 
0.505 1 
(1.87) * 
1.525 1 
(4.51) *** 
-0.8965 
(4.49) *** 
5.1542 
(3 39) 
2.3429 
(6.83) *** 
12.3356 
(26.93) 
153.93 
0.000 
-0.2749 
(7.74) *** 
-0.0076 
(0.77) 
0.0499 
(7.03) *** 
0.0001 
(1.1 1) 
-0.2971 
(6.50) 
14.82 
0.000 
0.7171 
(0.65) 
0.043 1 
(0.03) 
-2.5958 
(3.23) *** 
6.4430 
(0.40) 
-23.1695 
(7.05) *** 
-42.2593 
(6.3 1) 
18.62 
0.000 
TABLE 13 
Hypothesis One Testing - Filing Late vs. Sample Median 
Testing TIME as the time variable of interest. TIME defmed as the difference between the sample median 
days to file and the fum year observation days to file. 
DACC = a. + alTIME + a2LEVERAGE + a3LODISt + a4HIDISt + a5LNCASH + a6SIZE + 
a7PRICETOBOOK+ E 
TIME = a. + alDACC + qsize + a3EXTRA + a4AUDCHG + a5BUSY + a60PIN+ a7NEGNI + a,HIDISt + 
E 
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respectfully. 
Variables defined in table 6. t statistics in parentheses. 
Endogenous Variables 
TIME 
DACC 
Common Explanatory Variables 
LNTA 
HIDIS 
Absolute 
0.0427 
(9.93) *** 
-0.0407 
(5.49) *** 
-0.03 1 1 
(2.28) ** 
Value of DACC 
670.9204 
(8.29) *** 
-1.3713 
(2.87) *** 
-1.9414 
(1.37) 
Signed Value 
-0.0627 
(10.21) *** 
-0.024 1 
(2.19) ** 
0.0501 
(2.50) ** 
I 
0.7171 
(0.65) 
0.043 1 
(0.03) 
-2.5958 
(3.23) *** 
6.4430 
(0.40) 
-23.1695 
(7.05) *** 
-46.3593 
(6.92) 
18.62 
0.000 
of DACC 1 
-3.6653 
(1.52) 
-2.07 17 
(29.10) *** 
2.5 113 
(9.16) *** 
0.3864 
(7.56) *** 
-0.0335 
(2.33) ** 
-0.1 115 
(11.05) *** 
0.0000 
(0.25) 
0.1708 
(3.58) 
19.58 
0.000 
Variables for Earnings Management 
LEVERAGE 
LODIS 
LNCASH 
PRICETOBOOK 
Variables for Time to File 
EXTRA 
AUDCHG 
BUSY 
OPIN 
NEGNI 
CONSTANT 
F test 
F test probability 
0.505 1 
(1.87) * 
1.525 1 
(4.51) *** 
-0.8965 
(4.49) 
5.1542 
(3.89) *** 
2.3429 
(6.83) *** 
8.2356 
(17.98) 
153.93 
0.000 
-0.2749 
(7.74) *** 
-0.0076 
(0.77) 
0.0499 
(7.03) *** 
0.0001 
(1.1 1) 
-0.1221 
(3.78) 
14.82 
0.000 
TABLE 14 
Hypothesis One Testing - Filing Late vs. Five Days Later Than Prior Year 
Testing TIME as the time variable of interest. TIME defined as the difference between the company prior 
year filing date plus 5 days and the current fm year observation days to file. 
DACC = a. + alTIME + azLEVERAGE + a3LODISt + a4HIDISt + a5LNCASH + a6LNTA + 
a7PRICETOBOOK+ E 
TIME = a. + alDACC + azsize + a3EXTRA + a4AUDCHG + a5BUSY + a60PIN+ a7NEGNI + asHIDISt + 
E 
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respectfully. 
Variables defined in table 6. t statistics in parentheses. 
Endogenous Variables 
TIME 
DACC 
Common Explanatory Variables 
LNTA 
HIDIS 
Absolute 
0.0521 
(6.07) *** 
-0.0108 
(1.49) 
0.0174 
(1.08) 
Value of DACC 
566.7895 
(6.21) *** 
-2.7223 
(5.33) *** 
-2.7039 
(2.1 1) ** 
Signed Value 
-0.685 
(6.12) *** 
-0.0523 
(5.51) *** 
-0.0247 
(1.17) 
0.0713 
(0.07) 
-0.8845 
(0.62) 
-1.5691 
(2.20) ** 
-7.1217 
(0.55) 
-1 8.8293 
(5.76) *** 
-40.7699 
(5.48) 
5.40 
0.000 
of DACC 
-7.7854 
(3.26) *** 
-0.13 10 
(1.91) * 
0.4936 
(1.77) * 
0.1213 
(2.75) *** 
-0.029 1 
(1.81) * 
-0.0626 
(7.20) *** 
-0.0002 
(0.70) 
0.1215 
(2.07) 
9.36 
0.000 
Variables for Earnings Management 
LEVERAGE 
LODIS 
LNCASH 
PRICETOBOOK 
Variables for Time to File 
EXTRA 
AUDCHG 
BUSY 
opin 
NEGNI 
CONSTANT 
F test 
F test probability 
0.1629 
(0.59) 
1.2304 
(3.44) *** 
-0.9789 
(4.91) *** 
1.6972 
(1.80) * 
0.1889 
(0.53) 
4.9896 
(10.89) 
8.91 
0.000 
-0.1013 
(3.00) *** 
-0.0048 
(0.39) 
0.0177 
(2.64) *** 
0.0003 
(1.30) 
-0.1 143 
(2.59) 
5.79 
0.000 
TABLE 15 
Hypothesis One Testing - Filing Late vs. Five Days Later Than Industry Mean 
Testing TIME as the time variable of interest. TIME defmed as the difference between the indushy mean 
days to file plus five days and the firm year observation days to file. 
DACC = a. + alTIME + a2LEVERAGE + a3LODISt + a4HIDISt + asLNCASH + a6LNTA + 
a7PRICETOBOOK+ E 
TIME = a, + alDACC + a2size + a3EXTRA + a4AUDCHG + a5BUSY + a60PIN+ a7NEGNI + asHIDISt + 
E 
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respectfully. 
Variables defined in table 6. t statistics in parentheses. 
Endogenous Variables 
TIME 
DACC 
Common Explanatory Variables 
LNTA 
HIDIS 
Variables for Earnings Management 
LEVERAGE 
LODIS 
LNCASH 
PRICETOBOOK 
Variables for Time to File 
EXTRA 
AUDCHG 
BUSY 
OPIN 
NEGNI 
CONSTANT 
F test 
F test probability 
Absolute 
0.05 14 
(5.47) *** 
-0.0364 
(2.58) *** 
-0.1036 
(3.01) *** 
-0.2577 
(3.66) *** 
0.0120 
(0.56) 
0.0308 
(2.77) *** 
0.0001 
(0.41) 
-0.7501 
(4.62) 
4.56 
0.000 
Value of DACC 
944.0594 
(7.52) *** 
-3.5491 
(4.84) *** 
-2.7618 
(1.35) 
1.3506 
(0.87) 
-0.2881 
(0.13) 
-2.8229 
(2.42) ** 
9.0171 
(0.37) 
-34.6293 
(6.83) *** 
-59.0335 
(5.68) 
9.24 
0.000 
Signed 
-0.0626 
(4.86) *** 
-0.0070 
(0.40) 
0.1242 
(2.80) *** 
0.2965 
(3.29) *** 
0.0064 
(0.25) 
-0.0756 
(5.37) *** 
0.000 1 
(0.70) 
0.8818 
(4.03) 
5.03 
0.000 
Value of DACC 
-4.0532 
(1.01) 
- 1.2984 
(10.79) *** 
3.495 1 
. (7.51) *** 
1.0443 
(2.35) ** 
1.7969 
(2.98) *** 
-0.4246 
(1.20) 
7.1698 
(2.36) ** 
1.3725 
(2.38) ** 
17.7909 
(22.78) 
29.19 
0.000 
TABLE 16 
Hypothesis One Testing - Filing Late vs. Five Days Later Than Industry Median 
Testing TIME as the time variable of interest. TIME defmed as the difference between the industry median 
days to file plus five days and the fm year observation days to file. 
DACC = a. + alTIME + a2LEVERAGE + a3LODISt + a4HIDISt + aSLNCASH + a6LNTA + 
a7PRICETOBOOK+ E 
TIME = a0 + alDACC + azsize + a3EXTRA + a4AUDCHG + aSBUSY + a60PIN+ a7NEGNI + asHIDISt + 
E 
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respecthlly. 
Variables defined in table 6. t statistics in parentheses. 
Endogenous Variables 
TIME 
DACC 
Common Explanatory Variables 
LNTA 
HIDIS 
Absolute 
0.0505 
(9.00) *** 
-0.0467 
(5.28) *** 
-0.0344 
(2.15) ** 
Value of DACC 
637.0776 
(8.12) *** 
-1.3519 
(2.93) *** 
-1.7850 
(1.33) 
Signed Value 
-0.0727 
(8.84) *** 
-0.03 14 
(2.39) ** 
0.0533 
(2.30) ** 
I 
0.6257 
(0.60) 
0.0487 
(0.03) 
-2.2025 
(2.87) *** 
5.9237 
(0.39) 
-22.0991 
(6.95) *** 
-39.3240 
(6.06) 
17.49 
0.000 
of DACC 
-0.5 194 
(0.22) 
-1.9252 
(27.28) *** 
2.4200 
(8.90) *** 
0.4022 
(6.68) *** 
0.0098 
(0.59) 
-0.1143 
(9.69) *** 
-0.000 1 
(0.33) 
0.5863 
(6.35) 
14.75 
0.000 
Variables for Earnings Management 
LEVERAGE 
LODIS 
LNCASH 
PRICETOBOOK 
Variables for Time to File 
EXTRA 
AUDCHG 
BUSY 
OPIN 
NEGNI 
CONSTANT 
F test 
F test probability 
0.4032 
(1 SO) 
1.4555 
(4.29) *** 
-0.5696 
(2.86) *** 
4.6095 
(4.77) *** 
2.4028 
(7.02) *** 
12.5259 
(27.64) 
132.91 
0.000 
-0.2913 
(7.03) *** 
0.0086 
(0.74) 
0.0529 
(6.40) *** 
0.0002 
(1.48) 
-0.4147 
(6.65) 
12.07 
0.000 
TABLE 17 
Hypothesis One Testing - Year Sensitivity Testing 
Testing Days to File as the time variable of interest. Dummy variables are included to represent the years included in the sample. The 
year 2003 is used as the zero year. 
Endogenous Variables 
DAYSTOFILE 
DACC 
LNT A 
HIDIS 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2004 
LEVERAGE 
LODIS 
LNCASH 
PRICETOBOOK 
EXTRA 
AUDCHG 
BUSY 
OPM 
NEGNI 
CONSTANT 
Absolute 
0.0301 
(10.84) *** 
-0.0260 
(5.18) *** 
-0.0212 
(2.20) ** 
-0.2323 
(7.78) *** 
-0.2261 
(8.81) *** 
-0.211 1 
(8.86) *** 
-0.1971 
(8.69) *** 
-0.2147 
(8.99) *** 
-0.2275 
(9.27) *** 
-0.2041 
(8.64) *** 
-0.1769 
(8.26) *** 
-0.1606 
(8.16) *** 
0.0887 
(3.88) *** 
-0.167 1 
(7.47) *** 
-0.0005 
(0.07) 
0.0339 
(7.22) *** 
0.0001 
(1.59) *** 
-2.500 
(10.48) 
Value of DACC 
471.3765 
(7.77) *** 
0.3454 
(0.99) 
-0.4927 
(0.49) 
-1.1354 
(0.54) 
8.6839 
(8.04) *** 
5.7562 
(5.28) *** 
2.2690 
(1.82) * 
2.7947 
(2.28) ** 
5.0955 
(4.64) *** 
-0.3967 
(0.26) 
0.8089 
(0.62) 
3.6626 
(3.29) *** 
-1.7663 
(0.96) 
0.781 1 
(0.98) 
0.3074 
(0.27) 
-1.9886 
(3.43) *** 
5.9132 
(0.52) 
-15.2568 
(6.18) *** 
54.1881 
(1 1.75) 
Signed 
-.05 11 
(11.37) *** 
-0.0092 
(1.08) 
0.0446 
(2.75) *** 
0.3719 
(7.61) *** 
0.3737 
(8.90) *** 
0.3570 
(9.15) *** 
0.3466 
(9.34) *** 
0.3761 
(9.65) *** 
0.3929 
(9.82) *** 
0.3954 
(10.25) *** 
0.3346 
(9.53) *** 
0.28 19 
(8.68) *** 
-0.1608 
(4.20) *** 
0.2622 
(7.23) *** 
-0.0241 
(2.10) ** 
-0.0955 
(12.51) *** 
0.0000 
(0.11) 
4.2370 
(10.95) 
Value of DACC 
-0.7653 
(0.33) 
-1.9973 
(28.50) *** 
2.3962 
(8.88) *** 
8.9220 
(14.57) *** 
7.7689 
(15.57) *** 
7.3838 
(17.54) *** 
7.2114 
(18.71) *** 
7.6944 
(20.57) *** 
8.1413 
(21.95) *** 
7.7374 
(19.76) *** 
6.2893 
(16.15) *** 
5.0158 
(12.02) *** 
-3.4766 
(4.93) *** 
0.6139 
(2.35) ** 
1.8715 
(5.48) *** 
-1.0127 
(5.15) *** 
4.5427 
(2.97) *** 
2.9648 
(8.75) *** 
88.4833 
(162.88) 
TABLE 18 
Hypothesis One Testing - Post 2000 Sensitivity Testing 
Test using days to file as the time variable of interest. The sample is segregated into fum year prior to 
200 1 and fm years subsequent to 2000. 
DACC = a. + alTIME + a,LEVERAGE + a3LODISt + a4HIDISt + asLNCASH + a6LNTA + 
a7PRICETOBOOK+ E 
TIME = a. + alDACC + azLNTA + a3EXTRA + a4AUDCHG + a5BUSY + a60PIN+ a7NEGNI + 
anHIDISt + E 
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respectfully. 
Variables defined in table 6. t statistics in parentheses. 
Endogenous Variables 
DAYSTOFILE 
DACC 
Common Explanatory Variables 
LNTA 
HIDIS 
Absolute Value of DACC, years 
1994 - 2000 
0.0462 
(7.39) *** 
-0.0283 
(3.27) *** 
-0.0489 
(2.55) ** 
Absolute Value of 
- 
0.0 167 
(9.07) *** 
-0.0229 
(4.36) *** 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
Variables for Earnings Management 
LEVERAGE 
~ 
LODIS 
LNCASH 
PRICETOBOOK 
Variables for Time to File 
EXTRA 
AUDCHG 
BUSY 
OPIN 
NEGNI 
CONSTANT 
F test 
F test probability 
323.6 134 
(5.52) *** 
0.1462 
(0.40) 
0.8 107 
(0.95) 
DACC, years 200 1 
2004 
943.4004 
(6.37) *** 
1.1236 
(1.37) 
-6.8329 
(2.07) ** 
-0.1377 
(5.20) *** 
-0.0139 
(1.86) * 
0.0213 
(4.67) *** 
0.0001 
(1.13) 
-1.4862 
(8.59) 
12.76 
0.000 
2.3631 
(0.99) 
2.0021 
(0.66) 
-3.9406 
(2.20) * 
-38.5664 
(4.05) *** 
-24.1417 
(5.14) *** 
27.8060 
(2.5 1) 
8.85 
0.000 
-0.1984 
(5.46) *** 
-0.0 172 
(1.36) 
0.0486 
(5.34) *** 
0.0002 
(1.12) 
-4.1 123 
(7.2 1) 
8.48 
0.000 
0.4149 
(0.56) 
-0.1549 
(0.14) 
-1.1573 
(2.15) ** 
24.1433 
(3.02) *** 
-12.4550 
(4.34) *** 
66.2247 
(13.08) 
19.33 
0.000 
TABLE 19 
Hypothesis Two Testing 
Logit test using a dummy variable of firms filing subsequent to 93 days after the fum year end. Firms 
filing subsequent to the 93 days are given a value of one for the dependent dummy variable. 
LATEFILE = a, + alDACC + a2LNTA + a3EXTRA + a4AUDCHG + asBUSY + a60PIN+ a7NEGNI + 
asHIDISt + E 
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respectfully. 
Variables defined in table 6. t statistics in parentheses. 
ABSDACC 
LNTA 
EXTRA 
AUDCHG 
BUSY 
OPIN 
NEGNI 
HIDIS 
CONSTAN 
-1.0653 -0.88220 
Logit Test 
Absolute Value 
of DACC 
1.6255 
(5.05) *** 
-0.5274 
(13.91) *** 
0.2979 
(3.13) *** 
0.6 173 
(5.69) *** 
-0.4549 
(5.62) *** 
dropped 
1.45 18 
(15.82) *** 
1.1026 
(12.77) *** 
of Late Filers 
Signed Value of 
DACC 
-1.0882 
(3.72) *** 
-0.5363 
(14.18) *** 
0.3061 
(3.22) *** 
0.6170 
(5.69) *** 
-0.4539 
(5.61) *** 
dropped 
1.4035 
(14.73) *** 
1.1 140 
(12.90) *** 
TABLE 20 
Hypothesis Three Testing 
Results of testing for a relationship between market reaction and DACC. Testing hypothesis three using 
CARS based upon -181 to -1 days prior to the earnings announcement date. 
CAR, = a. + alDACC + a2TA + a3UNEXP + E 
Adj R2 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 
Absdacc The absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated as the residuals from the cash 
flow variant of the modified Jones model. 
ABSDACC 
DACC 
LNTASS 
UNEXP 
CONSTANT 
Dacc The discretionary accruals calculated as the residuals from the cash flow variant of the 
modified Jones model. 
Unexpected Discretionary 
Accruals 
Lntass The log of total assets. The proxy variable for size. 
Absolute 
Value of 
DACC 
15.6389 
(0.66) 
0.5388 
(1.1 1) 
0.0099 
(0.45) 
- 1.9536 
(0.57) 
Discretionary Accruals 
Unexp Earnings surprise proxied by the difference between the prior year earnings per share and 
the current year earnings per share. 
Signed Value 
of DACC 
-16.1891 
(0.67) 
0.5395 
(1.11) 
0.0099 
(0.45) 
-1.9551 
(0.57) 
Absolute Value 
of DACC 
11.3341 
(0.52) 
0.7679 . 
(1.80) * 
0.0181 
(1 .OO) 
-4.1774 
(1.28) 
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respectfully. t statistics in parentheses. 
Signed Value of 
DACC 
-1 1.0725 
(0.52) 
0.7666 
(1.80) * 
0.0181 
(1 .OO) 
-4.1473 
(1 -28) 
TABLE 2 1 
Hypothesis Three Testing 
Results of testing for a relationship between market reaction and DACC. Testing hypothesis three using 
CARS based upon - 18 1 to - 10 days prior to the earnings announcement date. 
CAR, = a, + alDACC + a2TA + a3UNEXP + E 
Adj R2 0.0022 0.0022. 0.0 188 0.0174 
Absdacc The absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated as the residuals fiom the cash 
flow variant of the modified Jones model. 
ABSDACC 
DACC 
LNTASS 
UNEXP 
CONSTANT 
Dacc The discretionary accruals calculated as the residuals fiom the cash flow variant of the 
modified Jones model. 
Unexpected Discretionary 
Accruals 
Lntass The log of total assets. The proxy variable for size. 
Discretionary Accruals 
Absolute 
Value of 
DACC 
0.8814 
(2.59) *** 
-0.0025 
(0.39) 
0.0006 
(0.23) 
0.0200 
(0.4 1) 
Unexp Earnings surprise proxied by the difference between the prior year earnings per share and 
the current year earnings per share. 
Absolute Value 
of DACC 
6.8607 
(0.06) 
3.3779 
(2.13) ** 
0.1670 
(0.34) 
-18.4884 
(1.24) 
Signed Value 
of DACC 
-0.7332 
(2.37) ** 
-0.0039 
(0.6 1) 
0.0006 
(0.25) 
0.03 12 
(0.65) 
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respectfully. t statistics in parentheses. 
Signed Value of 
DACC 
-6.8607 
(0.06) 
3.3779 
(2.13) ** 
0.1670 
(0.34) 
-18.4884 
(1.24) 
TABLE 22 
Hypothesis Three Sensitivity Testing 
Testing hypothesis three using CARS based upon -1 8 1 to - 1 days prior to the earnings announcement date. 
Testing only the extreme abnormal accruals, the top and bottom deciles of abnormal accruals. 
CAR, = a. + alDACC + a2TA + a3UNEXP + E 
Adj R2 0.0032 
ABSDACC 
LNTASS 
UNEXP 
CONSTAN 
T 
ABSDACC The absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated as the residuals from the cash 
flow variant of the modified Jones model. 
Absolute 
Value of 
DACC 
-02 12 
1.77 
.2893 
.29 
-.0098 
(0.64) 
-7.3282 
(1.65) 
LNTASS The log of total assets. The proxy variable for size. 
UNEXP Earnings surprise proxied by the difference between the pi-ior year earnings per share and 
the current year earnings per share. 
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respectfully. t statistics in parentheses. 
TABLE 23 
Hypothesis Four Testing 
Testing hypothesis four, market reaction to abnormal accruals for firms filing subsequent to 93 days later 
than the f i  year end. 
Adj R2 0.0197 0.0186 0.0052 0.0067 
ABSDACC 
DACC 
LNTASS 
UNEXP 
CONSTANT 
ABSDACC The absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated as the residuals fiom the cash 
flow variant of the modified Jones model. 
DACC The discretionary accruals calculated as the residuals from the cash flow variant of the 
modified Jones model. 
LNTA The log of total assets. The proxy variable for size. 
Discretionary Accruals 
UNEXP Earnings surprise proxied by the difference between the prior year earnings per share and 
the current year earnings per share. 
Absolute Value 
of DACC 
508.1747 
(1.34) 
14.1839 
(1.75) * 
-0.0442 
(0.05) 
- 109.574 1 
(1.90) 
Unexpected Discretionary 
Accruals 
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level respectfully. t statistics in parentheses. 
Signed Value of 
DACC 
-468.4083 
(1.30) 
14.2 147 
(1.75) * 
-0.0809 
(0.09) 
-106.7627 
(1.87) 
Absolute 
Value of 
D ACC 
-61 1.3128 
(1.05) 
20.3 126 
(1.72) * 
0.5329 
(0.22) 
-111.9359 
(1.49) 
Signed Value 
of DACC 
665.0149 
(1.09) 
20.6643 
(1.75) * 
0.7244 
(0.29) 
- 1 13.9690 
(1.51) 
